Benedictine Manor Of Lacrosse
Inspection history, citations, penalties and survey trends for this long-term care facility in La Crosse, Wisconsin.
- Location
- 2902 East Avenue South, La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601
- CMS Provider Number
- 525438
- Inspections on file
- 20
- Latest survey
- January 21, 2026
- Citations (last 12 mo.)
- 1
Citation history
Health deficiencies cited at Benedictine Manor Of Lacrosse during CMS and state inspections, most recent first.
A resident with multiple comorbidities, including vascular dementia, ESRD on dialysis, and diabetes with polyneuropathy, was care planned as dependent for bed mobility and transfers and required Ax2 with a Hoyer lift and Ax2 for ADLs and toileting due to fall risk and generalized weakness. A CNA who was pulled from restorative duties to assist on the unit provided morning toileting cares alone, believing the resident was a one-person assist, without verifying the posted CNA care guide that specified Ax2. While the CNA had the resident rolled onto his side, the resident rolled off the bed, struck a nearby chair, and fell to the floor, sustaining facial cuts and a closed right clavicle fracture confirmed in the ED. The facility’s investigation determined that the fall and injury occurred when the resident’s care plan, requiring two staff for bed mobility, was not followed.
The facility failed to adhere to professional standards for pressure injury care and hand hygiene, affecting three residents. One resident developed a new pressure injury due to inconsistent assessments and delayed interventions. Another resident's care plan was not updated promptly, delaying necessary interventions. Additionally, a nurse did not follow proper hand hygiene during wound care, compromising infection control.
The facility failed to ensure call lights were within reach for four residents, compromising their ability to request assistance. Observations showed call lights were inaccessible for residents with cognitive impairments and mobility issues. Despite staff acknowledging the importance of accessible call lights, no audits or staff education were conducted following a grievance, leading to a deficiency in meeting residents' needs.
The facility failed to maintain proper infection control practices, as staff did not adhere to hand hygiene protocols during medication administration, and a resident's catheter bag was improperly placed on the floor. The DON confirmed the expectations for hand hygiene and catheter care were not met.
A resident with a full code status was found unresponsive, but facility staff delayed CPR initiation, waiting for EMS instructions. Despite the resident's POLST indicating a desire for CPR, the staff did not act immediately, resulting in a deficiency due to the failure to follow advance directives.
Failure to Follow Two-Person Assist Care Plan Resulting in Fall and Fracture
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure adequate supervision and adherence to the care plan to prevent an accident for one resident at risk for falls. The resident had multiple diagnoses, including vascular dementia (moderate) without behavioral disturbance, end stage renal disease on dialysis, type 2 diabetes with diabetic polyneuropathy, depression, gout, and an acquired absence of the left foot. The resident’s MDS showed he was cognitively intact with a BIMS score of 15. Prior to the fall, his care plan and CNA care guide specified that he was dependent on staff for bed mobility, transfers, and locomotion, and required the assistance of two staff with a full-body Hoyer lift for transfers, as well as assist of two for ADLs and toileting per the mobility care plan. He was also care planned as being at risk for falls due to left-sided and generalized weakness. On the morning of the incident, a CNA who typically worked as a restorative aide was pulled to the hall to help get residents up and went in to assist this resident with morning cares. The CNA rolled the resident onto his left side and was performing toileting cares when the resident rolled off the bed, struck a chair next to the bed, and fell to the floor, landing face down. The CNA reported that she believed the resident was a one-person assist, although the care plan and CNA care guide required two-person assistance for ADLs and bed-related tasks. The CNA acknowledged that care guide sheets for each resident were posted inside the linen closet door on each hallway, that she knew this prior to helping the resident, and that she should have checked the sheet to verify whether another staff member was needed before providing care. Following the fall, nursing staff documented that the resident was found on the floor with facial cuts and was sent to the emergency department for evaluation. The ED record indicated that the resident reported falling out of bed while being assisted with dressing, hitting his head on the floor, and experiencing facial and right shoulder pain. Imaging revealed an equivocal minimally offset fracture of the distal right clavicle, and the ED impression documented a closed right clavicle fracture. The facility’s internal investigation concluded that the resident’s plan of care had not been followed, specifically that the CNA performed bed mobility alone when the resident required two staff for bed mobility, and that this failure to follow the care plan occurred at the time of the fall that resulted in the injury.
Deficiencies in Pressure Injury Care and Hand Hygiene
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to implement professional standards of practice for pressure injury care, resulting in deficiencies for three residents. Resident 52 was admitted with a stage II pressure injury and was at high risk for developing further injuries. However, the facility did not consistently complete weekly assessments, failed to implement timely interventions, and did not monitor the turning and repositioning program. Additionally, the resident was not educated on the risks and benefits of repositioning, and the physician was not notified when the pressure injury worsened. Consequently, Resident 52 developed a second stage II pressure injury. Resident 49 was admitted with pressure injuries, but the facility did not complete weekly assessments consistently. An air mattress intervention was delayed by eight days after admission. The care plan was not updated promptly to include a pressure-relieving mattress, which was only added eight days after admission, despite the resident having two pressure injuries. For Resident 2, the facility did not adhere to hand hygiene standards during pressure injury wound care. The nurse failed to remove gloves and perform hand hygiene after handling soiled materials and before applying a clean dressing. This lapse in infection control practices was observed during a surveyor's visit, highlighting a deficiency in maintaining proper hand hygiene protocols during wound care procedures.
Deficiency in Call Light Accessibility for Residents
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to ensure that call lights were within reach for four residents, leading to a deficiency in meeting the needs and preferences of these residents. Resident 18, who has moderate cognitive impairment and requires assistance with mobility, was observed with the call light out of reach while sitting in a recliner. Similarly, Resident 2, who is cognitively intact but requires supervision due to a non-weight bearing condition, had the call light on the floor, making it inaccessible. Resident 9, with moderate cognitive impairment and needing assistance with personal hygiene, had the call light placed on a bedside stand behind them, out of reach. These observations indicate a failure to adhere to the facility's policy of ensuring call lights are accessible to residents. Additionally, a grievance was filed regarding Resident 29's call light being out of reach, but no findings or actions were documented in the grievance log. Interviews with staff, including CNAs and the DON, confirmed that call lights should always be accessible to residents. However, no audits or spot checks were conducted following the grievance, and no staff education was provided to address the issue. This lack of action further contributed to the deficiency in ensuring residents' call lights were within reach, compromising their ability to request assistance when needed.
Infection Control Deficiencies in Hand Hygiene and Catheter Care
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to maintain an effective infection prevention and control program, as evidenced by multiple observations of staff not adhering to hand hygiene protocols and improper handling of a catheter bag. During medication administration, a registered nurse did not perform hand hygiene after taking vital signs for one resident and before administering insulin to another. This was contrary to the facility's hand hygiene policy, which requires hand hygiene before and after direct resident contact and after removing gloves. The Director of Nursing confirmed that the expectation is for hand hygiene to be performed between each resident interaction. Additionally, a resident's catheter bag was observed hanging from a garbage can and resting on the floor, which is not in compliance with the facility's policy on preventing catheter-associated urinary tract infections. The policy emphasizes the importance of proper catheter care to prevent complications such as cystitis and septic shock. A certified nursing assistant acknowledged that the placement of the catheter bag was unacceptable and took immediate action to correct it. The Director of Nursing confirmed that the catheter bag should not be on the floor.
Failure to Follow Advance Directives for CPR
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to adhere to a resident's advance directives regarding their code status, resulting in a deficiency. The resident, who had a Physician Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment (POLST) indicating a desire for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR), was found unresponsive, without respirations or a pulse. Despite the clear indication for CPR, the facility staff did not initiate resuscitation efforts immediately upon discovering the resident's condition. The incident involved a resident with a complex medical history, including end-stage renal disease, hypertension, and type 2 diabetes mellitus, among other conditions. The resident was found by a Registered Nurse (RN) kneeling on the floor with a grayish skin tone, indicating a lack of circulation. The RN confirmed the resident's full code status but delayed CPR initiation, opting to wait for Emergency Medical Services (EMS) instructions instead. The delay in initiating CPR lasted at least seven minutes from the time the resident's full code status was confirmed until EMS arrived and began resuscitation efforts. This delay was attributed to a lack of immediate action and delegation of duties among the staff, as noted by the Nursing Home Administrator and Director of Nursing. The facility's policy was not followed, leading to a finding of immediate jeopardy due to the failure to provide timely life-saving measures.
Removal Plan
- The facility completed crash cart audits, including nightly checks and weekly verification by DON B.
- The facility completed code status and POLST/POST audits for all facility residents.
- The facility reviewed/audited advance directives/care plans for all facility residents.
- The facility audited all in-house licensed staff on their CPR certifications.
- The facility provided all in-house licensed staff education, including RN D and RN E on the following: Facility CPR policy, Nurse response and initiation of CPR for residents with a full-code status, EMS activation, POLST/POST and code status location/verification, Crash cart location, Delegation of duties, CPR situational review.
- The facility provided all staff (except licensed staff) with education on roles and responsibilities during a CODE.
- Mock code competency audits were conducted on various shifts.
- Crash cart audits start and will continue beyond.
- Documentation of the completion of education for RN D and RN E following R1's incident.
- Education for all staff.
Latest citations in Wisconsin
Two residents did not receive skin care and monitoring consistent with professional standards or their expressed preferences. One resident sustained a right knee abrasion from a fall that was noted on a fall report but not reflected in subsequent weekly skin assessments, MAR/TAR entries, or progress notes; the resident later showed the surveyor a visible wound and reported that staff had not followed up after the initial fall. Nursing staff gave conflicting accounts about the existence and monitoring of this wound, and the DON was unaware of it and unable to describe its progression, while relying on CNAs to observe and report changes. Another resident developed a U-shaped area on the left back that a CNA described as a previously bruised, weeping area and a family member described as a bruise, yet weekly skin checks continued to document intact skin with no open areas and no specific description of this site. A later photo taken by the DON showed a U-shaped scar on the back, but there were no prior measurements, photos, or detailed documentation to track its development or characteristics.
Two residents experienced deficiencies in transfer safety when staff did not follow or update care-planned transfer methods. One resident with CVA and hemiplegia, care-planned for a Lumex transfer with two staff, was transferred by a single RN using the Lumex and was lowered to the floor when unable to continue standing. Another resident with MS, CVA, and severely impaired cognition, care-planned for pivot disc transfers with one staff, was observed being transferred with a Lumex by a CNA, despite the care plan not being revised to reflect this method and no documented therapy re-assessment for renewed Lumex use.
A resident with stroke-related hemiplegia and documented colonization with carbapenem-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa (CRPA) was care-planned for Enhanced Barrier Precautions (EBP), and the facility’s policy required gown and glove use for high-contact activities such as transfers. Despite EBP signage on the door and PPE available, a CNA and the NHA transferred the resident with a mechanical lift, physically holding and positioning the resident, without wearing gowns or gloves, and then continued tasks in the room. In interviews, the CNA, NHA, and DON stated they believed EBP applied only to direct care and did not include transfers, resulting in noncompliance with the facility’s infection prevention and control program.
A resident was admitted to hospice, which the facility’s DON identified as a significant change in condition requiring a Significant Change in Status Assessment (SCSA) MDS to be completed within 14 days per the RAI User Manual and facility policy. The last MDS for this resident had been completed earlier, and although an SCSA was started after the hospice admission, it was never completed or submitted. The resident later died, and the DON acknowledged that the significant change MDS was not completed within the required timeframe.
A resident with obesity, weakness, and type 2 DM with polyneuropathy, who had no cognitive impairment and required a sit-to-stand mechanical lift with two-person assist per the care plan, experienced a fall during a transfer when a CNA performed the lift alone. The CNA unhooked one side of the sling, had difficulty reaching the other side, unlocked the lift while the resident was partially on the bed with feet on the device and holding a trapeze, and the lift moved forward as the resident pushed with their legs, causing the resident to slide to the floor. Staff interviews confirmed that transfer requirements are obtained from the care plan/Kardex, that mechanical lifts may require two staff depending on the plan, and that this resident specifically required two-person assistance, but only one CNA was present at the time of the fall.
The facility failed to maintain required RN coverage and a full-time DON, resulting in no RN on duty for multiple days and no documented RN supervision of nursing staff. In this context, LPNs completed admission and readmission assessments for several residents with complex conditions such as diabetes, COPD, CHF, sepsis, ESRD, and osteomyelitis, and administered IV antibiotics, including via PICC lines, sometimes without appropriate IV certification. CMA/MTs independently assessed pain, administered PRN oxycodone, and injected insulin for a resident with diabetes and pressure ulcers, all without an RN employed to provide direct supervision. Leadership acknowledged reliance on LPNs and CMAs for these functions and on off-site or sister-facility DONs for support, but could not provide documentation of on-site RN coverage, leading surveyors to cite an immediate jeopardy deficiency.
A resident with COPD, emphysema, and leukemia, who was cognitively intact, reported shortness of breath and wheezing and received a PRN nebulizer treatment documented as effective, but no vital signs or comprehensive respiratory assessment were completed. Later, the resident told an LPN that she might need to go to the hospital due to ongoing shortness of breath; the LPN acknowledged this but did not immediately assess the resident, citing that the resident often complained and did not appear in dire need. The resident and her family member reported that she clearly requested to go to the hospital and that staff did not act, leading the family member to call 911. EMS transferred the resident to the hospital, where she was found to be hypoxic and was diagnosed with acute hypoxic respiratory failure, chronic PE, and bronchiectasis with acute lower respiratory infection.
A resident with a history of lumbar discitis/osteomyelitis and chronic myeloid leukemia had IV daptomycin discontinued after imaging showed improvement, and an ID physician faxed new orders for PO levofloxacin and PO vancomycin. Although the fax was confirmed as received and scanned, nursing did not transcribe these antibiotics into the EMR or MAR, and they were not administered for approximately two months, even as the resident reported to the ID physician via telehealth that she was tolerating levofloxacin, believing she was taking it. The oral antibiotic orders did not appear in the physician order listing until after the resident was hospitalized again for fever and pain, when imaging showed recurrent discitis/osteomyelitis and the hospital continued or resumed levofloxacin and PO vancomycin. In a separate incident, an LPN administered another resident’s IV ertapenem instead of the ordered IV daptomycin to this resident after taking the wrong medication from the refrigerator, contrary to facility policies requiring medications to be administered according to physician orders and pending orders to be checked and confirmed after physician visits.
The facility failed to provide enough qualified nursing staff and allowed improper delegation of nursing and medication tasks. On an evening shift, only three CNAs (one for a partial shift) were assigned to 34 residents, despite the facility’s own staffing plan calling for higher CNA coverage. A resident with multiple serious conditions, dependent for transfers and incontinent, reported waiting over three hours for toileting assistance and described routinely long call-light response times, while a family member reported chronic delays in staff response. A CMA/MT had been independently assessing pain and administering PRN oxycodone, including using a nonverbal pain scale, even though facility policy and state guidance restrict unlicensed staff from performing assessments or making PRN decisions. Multiple residents’ admission and readmission assessments and baseline care plans were completed and signed by LPNs without RN assessment, and LPNs were administering IV ertapenem via PICC lines without documented IV training or formal RN delegation, contrary to facility policy and Wisconsin scope-of-practice standards.
Surveyors found that the facility failed to follow its own food safety and sanitation policies, resulting in expired and improperly labeled food items stored in the walk-in cooler and freezer, including multiple juices and fish past their use-by or manufacturer expiration dates, as well as a torn-open package of hot dog buns exposed to air. They also observed cobwebs, dead insects, and accumulated dust and debris on the wall behind shelving where clean dishes were stored, with nearby window air-conditioning units that could blow contaminants onto the dishes. A dietary aide acknowledged that dietary staff should be monitoring expiration dates, and leadership later confirmed the expectation that expired items and unsanitary conditions should not be present, while 34 residents were placed at risk of foodborne illness.
Failure to Assess and Monitor Skin Wounds and Scars for Two Residents
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to provide treatment and care consistent with professional standards and resident preferences for two residents with skin impairments. For the first resident, who had diagnoses including cerebrovascular accident and hemiplegia and an intact BIMS score of 15, a fall report documented a right front knee abrasion at the time of a fall. Despite this, subsequent weekly skin assessments repeatedly documented intact skin with no indication of a right knee abrasion. When interviewed, the resident reported having a fall that caused a rug burn on the right knee and showed the surveyor a circular wound with a reddened periwound area, yellow center with visible depth, and red lines across the front of the knee. The resident stated staff looked at the wound when the fall occurred but did nothing afterward and expressed a desire for staff to look at and address the wound. Nursing staff interviews revealed inconsistent awareness and monitoring of this wound. An LPN initially stated the resident had no wounds or abrasions and confirmed there was no documentation or monitoring of a right knee wound in the medical record, despite the fall report noting an abrasion. The LPN later acknowledged the right knee wound was related to the fall and that the resident had been picking at it, describing a plan to keep it open to air and monitor, though this plan was not reflected in the record. Another nurse stated that if a wound or bruise is identified, it should be monitored and appear on the MAR or TAR until healed, but also indicated the resident did not have any wounds and only knew of a picked scab from report. The DON was not aware of the wound, found no documentation of it in progress notes, and later stated nurses were not expected to monitor the wound because CNAs observe wounds and report changes, while being unable to state whether the wound had changed in size or wound bed characteristics. For the second resident, who had diagnoses including heart failure and muscle weakness and a moderately impaired BIMS score of 12, the care plan identified potential or actual impairment to skin integrity related to multiple medical conditions. A CNA reported that this resident had a U-shaped area on the left back that had previously been a bruise and had been weeping, and stated this change had been reported to a nurse. A progress note documented a faded bruised area on the left back rib cage with scant blood related to a recent fall, but there was no further documentation of this area in the medical record. Weekly skin check forms over several months repeatedly documented skin as intact, dry, and fragile, with no open areas, and did not identify the U-shaped area on the back. A family member reported observing a U-shaped mark on the resident’s left back rib cage that appeared to be a bruise. Later, the DON presented a photo showing a U-shaped scar on the left back, approximately one inch wide with a line about 1/8 inch thick, but there were no prior photos or measurements to compare, and the scar’s details and location had not been documented on weekly skin assessments. The DON acknowledged that more thorough documentation on the skin check forms would have been helpful and stated that information for these forms was based on CNA observations and nursing assessments, which might not cover all skin areas depending on resident positioning.
Failure to Follow and Update Transfer Care Plans Leading to Unsafe Transfers
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to maintain an environment free of accident hazards and to provide adequate supervision during transfers for two residents. One resident with a history of cerebral vascular accident and hemiplegia, and with intact cognition per a BIMS score of 15/15, had a care plan dated 2/11/26 specifying transfers with a Lumex (manual stand assist lift) and assistance of two staff. Despite this, on 2/15/26 the resident was transferred from a chair to a shower chair by a single RN using a Lumex, during which the resident could no longer stand and was lowered to the ground. The DON confirmed that the care plan required two staff for transfers and that only one staff assisted during the incident, and the RN acknowledged transferring the resident alone, stating they believed only one staff was required. The second resident, with diagnoses including multiple sclerosis and cerebral vascular accident and a BIMS score of 7/15 indicating severely impaired cognition, had an ADL self-care performance care plan dated 2/11/26 that specified transfers with a pivot disc and one staff. However, surveyor observation on 3/31/26 showed a CNA transferring this resident from bed to wheelchair using a Lumex, which the resident successfully completed by following verbal cues. The DON reported that staff had used a Lumex with this resident for four years and verified that the care plan still indicated use of a pivot disc, acknowledging the care plan was incorrect. Therapy documentation showed that a pivot disc had been trialed and recommended for toilet transfers due to a custom-fit wheelchair that did not accommodate the Lumex, and that prior to this trial the resident had used a Lumex for transfers. The DON could not locate therapy notes indicating the resident had been re-assessed for renewed Lumex use, and the care plan had not been revised to reflect the resident’s current transfer method.
Failure to Follow Enhanced Barrier Precautions During Resident Transfer
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to implement its infection prevention and control program, specifically its Enhanced Barrier Precautions (EBP) policy, for a resident colonized with carbapenem-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa (CRPA). The facility’s EBP policy, revised 9/9/25, requires gown and glove use during high-contact resident care activities, including transfers, and specifies that EBP should be followed outside the resident’s room when performing transfers. The resident had a diagnosis of stroke with hemiplegia and an MDS assessment showing intact cognition with a BIMS score of 15/15. A care plan dated 2/18/26 documented CRPA colonization and included an intervention to observe EBP for infection control. On observation, an EBP sign was posted on the resident’s door and PPE was available next to the room. Despite this, a CNA entered the room without donning a gown or gloves and attached a lift sling to a mechanical lift. The Nursing Home Administrator then entered without gown or gloves and operated the lift while the CNA held the resident in the sling and maneuvered the resident into a wheelchair, including holding the resident’s leg and guiding the resident into the chair. After the transfer, the NHA sanitized the lift while the CNA provided the resident a hat and made the bed. In interviews, both the NHA and CNA stated they did not believe EBP was required because they did not consider the transfer to be direct care, and the DON reported being told that EBP was only required for direct care, which they understood did not include transfers.
Failure to Complete Timely Significant Change MDS After Hospice Admission
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to complete a Significant Change in Status Assessment (SCSA) Minimum Data Set (MDS) within the required timeframe after a resident experienced a significant change in condition. Facility policy on comprehensive assessments, last revised on an unspecified date, states that comprehensive assessments are to be conducted according to the criteria and timeframes in the Resident Assessment Instrument (RAI) User Manual, which requires that an SCSA be completed by the end of the 14th calendar day following determination of a significant change. The Director of Nursing (DON) stated that MDS assessments are completed on admission, annually, quarterly, with a significant change, and as needed, and that a significant change includes a decline or improvement in two or more areas of care or when a resident is admitted to or removed from hospice, with a completion timeframe of 14 or 15 days after recognizing the change. Surveyor review of the resident’s electronic health record showed that the last completed MDS assessment was done on a prior date, and the resident was later admitted to hospice, which the DON identified as a significant change requiring an SCSA. An SCSA was initiated after the hospice admission but was left incomplete and never submitted. The resident subsequently expired, and the DON acknowledged during interview that the significant change MDS had not been completed and was past the 14-day requirement.
Failure to Follow Two-Person Mechanical Lift Transfer Care Plan Resulting in Resident Fall
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure adequate supervision and adherence to the care plan for a resident requiring assistance with mechanical lift transfers. The facility’s own policies on falls and person-centered care planning require implementation of resident-specific fall prevention measures and provision of services as outlined in the care plan. For this resident, the comprehensive care plan identified self-care deficits related to type 2 diabetes and morbid obesity and specified that all transfers were to be completed using a sit-to-stand mechanical lift with the assistance of two staff. The resident, who had diagnoses including abnormal posture, weakness, type 2 diabetes with polyneuropathy, and morbid obesity, and who had no cognitive impairment per a BIMS score of 13/15, experienced a fall during a transfer. Progress notes document that a CNA was performing a sit-to-stand mechanical lift transfer to bed with only one staff member present, despite the care plan requirement for two-person assistance. During the transfer, the CNA had unhooked one side of the sling and was attempting to unhook the other side, had difficulty reaching, and then unlocked the sit-to-stand lift while the resident was partially on the bed, with feet on the lift and holding the bed trapeze. Because the resident was pushing with their legs, the lift moved forward and the resident slowly slid to the floor. Interviews confirmed that staff were aware that mechanical lifts, including sit-to-stand devices, may require two staff depending on the care plan, and that this resident specifically required two-person assistance for transfers. The resident reported that only one CNA was present at the time of the fall and that usually two staff assist due to the resident’s size. Nursing and CNA staff described that they rely on the care plan or Kardex in the computer to determine transfer needs and acknowledged that sit-to-stand lifts can require one or two staff based on the resident’s plan of care. The DON acknowledged that the CNA involved was working alone during the transfer when the fall occurred and was not following the resident’s care plan.
Lack of RN Coverage and Oversight Leading to Out-of-Scope Nursing and Medication Practices
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to employ a full-time RN designated as the DON and to ensure RN services were provided at least eight consecutive hours a day, seven days a week, as required by regulation and by the facility’s own nursing services policy. Payroll-Based Journal staffing data for the first quarter of 2026 showed a one-star staffing rating and multiple days with no RN hours. Review of daily staffing schedules for several consecutive days in March showed no RN scheduled on any of those dates, indicating there was no RN assigned to supervise nursing staff or oversee resident care. The Administrator confirmed that the DON, who had been the only full-time RN, resigned and her last day was mid-March, and the ADON confirmed that since that resignation there had been no RN employed by the facility and that even when a DON was employed, most weekends did not have RN coverage. In the absence of consistent RN presence and oversight, LPNs were performing admission and readmission nursing assessments and administering IV medications, and CMA/MTs were performing pain assessments, administering PRN pain medications, and administering insulin, all of which were outside their scope of practice as described in the report. Multiple residents’ records showed admission data collection and baseline care plan tools completed and signed by LPNs rather than an RN. For example, one resident admitted with diabetes type 2, osteomyelitis of vertebra, and orthopedic aftercare had a 72-hour admission/re-admission assessment documented by an LPN. Another resident admitted with COPD and traumatic ischemia of muscle had admission data collection and baseline care plan tools completed and signed by an LPN, with a late-entry health status note by a sister-facility DON added seven days after admission. Additional residents admitted with chronic congestive heart failure, sepsis, diabetes type 2, congestive heart failure, and ESRD also had admission data collection notes completed by LPNs. The report further documents that LPNs administered IV medications, including through PICC lines, without RN oversight, and in at least one case outside the LPN’s own training and certification. One resident with an order for IV ertapenem had doses administered on three consecutive days by an LPN and the ADON, who is also an LPN. The ADON stated that most LPNs had been trained to administer IV medications, but identified two LPNs who were not certified, while the former DON stated she believed those LPNs were certified and had allowed them to administer IV medications after observing them. CMA/MTs were documented as completing pain assessments and administering PRN oxycodone and insulin injections without an RN employed to provide direct supervision. One resident with diabetes type 2, bilateral stage II heel pressure ulcers, chronic pulmonary embolism, and vertebral osteomyelitis had multiple pain assessments and PRN oxycodone doses documented by a CMA/MT, as well as several insulin doses administered by the same CMA/MT. Interviews with the RDO and Medical Director confirmed that RN coverage was expected to be provided by DONs from sister facilities, but there was no documentation of their presence in the building, and the Medical Director emphasized that RNs are responsible for assessments, IVs, and staff supervision to ensure practice within scope. These combined actions and inactions led surveyors to identify immediate jeopardy beginning in mid-March.
Removal Plan
- Employ a full-time interim DON
- Provide staff education on notification of changes in condition
- Assess nurses' IV competency
- Employ an agency RN to ensure RN coverage on Saturdays and Sundays
- Reassess all residents with IVs, pressure injuries, and new admissions
- Reassess all residents with a documented change in condition
Failure to Assess Resident’s Respiratory Change in Condition and Request for Hospital Transfer
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to assess and respond appropriately to a resident-reported change in condition related to respiratory symptoms. The resident had significant medical diagnoses including COPD, panlobular emphysema, osteomyelitis of the lumbar vertebra, and chronic myeloid leukemia. A recent MDS showed the resident was cognitively intact with a BIMS score of 15 and used a wheelchair for mobility. The care plan also identified a focus on the resident and spouse making inappropriate EMS 911 calls when no true emergency existed, with interventions focused on educating them about appropriate EMS use. On the day of the incident, the resident reported shortness of breath and wheezing and received a PRN nebulizer treatment of Ipratropium-Albuterol, which was documented as effective. However, the LPN did not collect additional assessment data or notify an RN of the resident’s complaint of shortness of breath. No comprehensive respiratory assessment or vital signs were obtained at that time despite the resident’s symptoms. Later that same day, the resident told the LPN that she "may need to go to the hospital" and reported feeling short of breath. The LPN acknowledged that the resident made this statement but did not immediately assess the resident, stating she believed the resident was not in dire need and that the resident often complained of various ailments. According to the resident’s account, she specifically told the LPN that she needed to go to the hospital, was wheezing a lot, and tried to stay calm while waiting about an hour without staff action, after which she called her husband. The husband reported that the resident was crying, calling out in the hallway, and that he called 911 because staff were not doing anything. The facility’s grievance file and staff statements documented that the LPN was aware the resident said she "may need to go to the hospital" but did not complete an assessment before EMS arrived. The resident was transferred to the hospital, where she was found to have hypoxia with low oxygen saturation and was diagnosed with acute hypoxic respiratory failure, chronic pulmonary emboli without acute cor pulmonale, and bronchiectasis with acute lower respiratory infection. The Medical Director later stated her expectation that when a resident states they want to go to the hospital, staff should conduct an assessment, obtain vital signs, and report to the provider.
Failure to Transcribe and Administer Ordered Antibiotics and Wrong IV Medication Administration
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure a resident was free from significant medication errors, specifically related to transcription and administration of ordered antibiotics and the administration of another resident’s IV antibiotic. The resident had a history of lumbar discitis/osteomyelitis and chronic myeloid leukemia and had been receiving IV daptomycin via PICC line following a hospital stay. An MRI in mid-January showed improvement, and the infectious disease (ID) physician initially ordered discontinuation of IV daptomycin, PICC removal, and discontinuation of weekly labs. The following day, after further review of the MRI and inflammatory markers, the ID physician ordered a transition to oral levofloxacin 750 mg daily and oral vancomycin 125 mg daily for several weeks, including vancomycin for C. diff prophylaxis. These orders were faxed to the facility and were later confirmed by the fax company and the Business Office Manager as having been received by the facility. Despite receipt of the faxed orders, the facility did not transcribe the oral levofloxacin and oral vancomycin into the resident’s physician orders or MAR for January or February, and there was no evidence on the MAR that these medications were administered during that period. The physician order listing for the resident showed that the oral levofloxacin and vancomycin orders did not appear until mid-March, when the resident returned from the hospital with those medications ordered. During telemedicine follow-up with the ID physician, the resident reported doing well and tolerating levofloxacin, believing she was taking the ordered antibiotics, even though the MAR showed no administration. The resident, who was cognitively intact per a BIMS score of 15, later stated she only took medications provided by the facility and did not know the oral antibiotics had not been given. The Assistant DON and consultant pharmacist both confirmed that no orders for oral levofloxacin or vancomycin were received by the pharmacy or entered into the system in January or February. In March, the resident was sent to the ER with fever and left knee pain, and imaging showed extensive osseous erosion at L1-2 concerning for discitis/osteomyelitis. The hospital documentation referenced the resident as being chronically on levofloxacin and oral vancomycin for discitis and continued or resumed these medications, which were then first documented as administered at the facility in mid-March. Separately, in January, a medication occurrence report documented that an LPN administered another resident’s IV antibiotic, ertapenem, instead of the ordered daptomycin to this resident. The LPN later stated she did not check thoroughly enough and took the wrong IV medication from the refrigerator, describing it as an honest mistake and noting that previously there had only been one resident with an IV. The facility’s own policies required medications to be administered according to physician orders and required licensed nurses to check and confirm pending orders after physician visits, but the faxed ID orders for oral antibiotics were not processed, and the wrong IV antibiotic was administered on one occasion. The Medical Director stated she was not aware that the resident was supposed to start two oral antibiotics in January as ordered by the ID physician and indicated her expectation that any faxed orders for oral antibiotics would be processed and administered. The Business Office Manager described the process for handling telehealth visit notes and faxed orders, explaining that nursing staff received faxed records and placed them in a bin for scanning into the EMR under a miscellaneous tab. With assistance from the fax company, the BOM confirmed that the fax containing the orders to start oral levofloxacin and add oral vancomycin was received by the facility. The facility’s policies on medication errors and physician orders emphasized preventing significant medication errors and ensuring orders were entered and confirmed, but the failure to transcribe and administer the ordered oral antibiotics and the administration of another resident’s IV antibiotic constituted significant medication errors for this resident.
Inadequate Staffing and Improper Delegation of Nursing and Medication Tasks
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to provide sufficient and appropriately qualified nursing staff to meet residents’ needs, and failure to ensure that LPNs and CMAs/MTs practiced within their legal scope and professional standards. The facility’s own facility assessment called for a CNA-to-resident ratio of one CNA for ten to sixteen residents on the evening shift, yet on the evening of survey entry there were only three CNAs for 34 residents, with one CNA scheduled for only a partial shift. Interviews and documentation, including a police body-worn camera narrative, showed that staff and leadership acknowledged difficulty providing needed care due to lack of staffing. The Nursing Home Administrator told police that one resident needed constant care that was difficult to provide because of staffing shortages, and an LPN stated she felt residents needed more attention than staff could provide. One resident with osteomyelitis of the lumbar vertebra, COPD, emphysema, and chronic myeloid leukemia, who was wheelchair-bound, dependent for transfers, and frequently incontinent of bowel, reported waiting over three hours for assistance after a bowel movement, prompting a call to local police. This resident later told the surveyor that call lights usually took 30–45 minutes to be answered and that care was timelier while surveyors were present. A family member reported that it took staff “forever” to respond to this resident’s needs and that he had complained to the ADON about response times. These accounts, combined with staffing records, demonstrated that the facility did not have enough staff on duty to meet residents’ immediate care needs. The facility also failed to ensure that CMAs/MTs and LPNs practiced within their scope and under appropriate RN oversight. A CMA/MT had been independently assessing residents’ pain and administering PRN oxycodone, including documenting pre- and post-administration pain levels, despite state guidance that assessments cannot be delegated to unlicensed personnel and facility policy stating that CMAs/MTs are not to assess pain or administer PRN medications without an RN’s assessment. The CMA/MT reported using both verbal reports and a nonverbal pain scale and believed this was within her scope, while the VPCO and FDON later stated it was not. Additionally, multiple admission and readmission nursing assessments and baseline care plan tools for several residents were completed and signed by LPNs without evidence of RN assessment, even though state standards limit LPNs to data collection and require RNs to complete resident assessments. The FDON and ADON acknowledged that, in the absence of an RN DON and because most admissions occurred on evenings, LPNs had been completing all initial nursing assessments for years. Further, the facility did not ensure that LPNs performing IV therapy had the required additional training and RN delegation as outlined in facility policy and state guidance. One resident with an order for IV ertapenem via PICC line received this medication on multiple days from LPNs, including an LPN whose personnel file contained no documentation of IV therapy training. The ADON confirmed that this LPN was not certified to administer IV/PICC medications, while the LPN stated she had been hanging IV medications via PICC lines since hire, without formal facility training, and was sometimes the only nurse available to administer PICC medications, with the other staff person being a CMA/MT. The FDON stated she supervised licensed staff and had observed LPNs administering IV medications without concerns, but there was no evidence of the documented training and competency validation required by facility policy for delegation of IV tasks to LPNs. Collectively, these findings showed that the facility did not maintain adequate RN presence, did not follow its own delegation and competency policies, and allowed LPNs and CMAs/MTs to perform assessments and IV tasks beyond their scope, affecting all residents in the facility.
Expired Food and Unsanitary Kitchen Conditions in Dietary Services
Penalty
Summary
Surveyors identified a deficiency in the facility’s food service operations related to failure to follow its own food safety and sanitation policies. The facility’s policies required that all local, state, and federal standards be followed, that food be protected from contamination, and that perishable foods be used prior to their use-by or expiration dates, with out-of-date foods discarded. During an observation of the kitchen’s walk-in cooler, surveyors found multiple juice containers labeled by the facility with use-by dates that had already passed, including cranberry juice, orange juice, and apple juice. They also found a container of concentrated lemon juice with a manufacturer’s expiration date that had already passed, despite the facility having applied a later “use by” date that extended beyond the manufacturer’s expiration. Further observations in the kitchen’s walk-in freezer revealed a torn-open package of hot dog buns with several buns exposed to air and an opened box of fish with a manufacturer’s expiration date that had already passed. Additional inspection of the kitchen area showed multiple cobwebs and dead insects on the wall behind portable shelving where clean dishes were stored, along with a buildup of black and gray dust and debris. Two window unit air conditioners were located next to this shelving, with the potential to blow debris and pests onto the clean dishes if turned on. A dietary aide acknowledged these conditions during the survey, stating that all dietary staff should be checking use-by and expiration dates. The Regional Director of Operations later stated it was her expectation that there would be no items beyond use-by or expiration dates and no dust or dead bugs in the kitchen. These failures placed all 34 residents at risk of foodborne illnesses.
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