Colorado Veterans Community Living Ctr At Homelake

Penalty

No penalty information released

The penalty, as released by CMS, applies to the entire inspection this citation is part of, covering all citations and f-tags issued, not just this specific f-tag. For the complete original report, please refer to the 'Details' section.

Summary

The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to protect residents from abuse, specifically resident-to-resident physical abuse between two cognitively impaired residents in the memory care unit. Facility policy required that residents be free from all forms of abuse and that staff immediately intervene, ensure resident safety, and keep residents separated and monitored when an assailant is identified. Despite this policy, the facility’s own investigation of an incident on 11/26/25 documented that two residents in the memory care unit became frustrated and agitated with each other, with elevated voices and defensive body language, and moved their arms as if they were going to hit each other. One resident sustained a superficial scratch above his left eyebrow, and the investigation concluded that the other resident likely made contact, resulting in the injury, and the incident was substantiated as physical abuse. One resident involved had Alzheimer’s disease and schizophrenia, was severely cognitively impaired with a BIMS score of 1, and required maximum assistance with ADLs. His care plan identified him as being at risk for resident-to-resident altercations related to individuals invading his space and at risk for re‑traumatization, with anxiety triggered by male caregivers or those perceived to be male. Interventions in his care plan included providing opportunities for positive interaction and attention, such as stopping and talking with him while passing by. On the date of the incident, a skin assessment documented a scratch above his left eyebrow, consistent with the facility’s determination that he was the victim of physical abuse by another resident. The other resident involved had Lewy body dementia, hypertension, and depression, was also severely cognitively impaired with a BIMS score of 0, and required maximum assistance with ADLs. His behavior care plan identified a risk for verbally abusive behaviors and potential psychosocial issues due to a prior incident in which he had received unprovoked agitation with physical abuse from another resident, with interventions including monitoring for signs of aggression, fear, or psychosocial trauma and documenting behaviors and interventions. An antipsychotic medication care plan further identified him as being at risk for aggressive behaviors, including non‑redirectable agitation, with instructions to intervene immediately if agitation was observed. Staff interviews indicated that only one staff member was assigned to seven residents on the unit, that residents sometimes got into each other’s space and fights occurred, and that the two residents had been seen in a fist fight on the date of the incident, demonstrating that the facility did not effectively prevent or intervene to stop resident‑to‑resident physical abuse in accordance with its abuse prevention policy and the residents’ care plans.

Penalty

No penalty information released

The penalty, as released by CMS, applies to the entire inspection this citation is part of, covering all citations and f-tags issued, not just this specific f-tag. For the complete original report, please refer to the 'Details' section.

Summary

The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to thoroughly investigate and document allegations of sexual abuse and rough, abusive care toward a resident. The facility’s abuse policy required that all reports of resident abuse be thoroughly investigated and documented. An investigation dated 2/24/26 addressed an allegation that a resident was sexually abused during incontinence care, but the investigation did not include interviewing the resident’s roommate about what he might have seen or heard during the alleged incident. The investigation concluded the allegation was unsubstantiated based on lack of physical trauma and staff statements, and it attributed the resident’s report to cognitive decline and terminal agitation, despite the resident’s clear and consistent account during the survey interview. The resident involved was under age 65 with diagnoses including bipolar disorder, anxiety, depression, PTSD, and traumatic brain injury. A recent MDS showed moderate cognitive impairment (BIMS 12/15), aggressive behavior, and delusions, and the resident was dependent on staff for toileting, transfers, and bed mobility, using a manual wheelchair. During the facility’s investigation, the resident reported that while yelling for help after a bowel movement, a CNA entered and began care, and then an LPN took over. The resident stated he did not want the LPN to provide care, tried to swat him away, and that the LPN grabbed his hands, rolled him aggressively causing his head to hit the wall, and inserted a finger into his anus four times while wiping, despite the resident yelling for him to stop. Staff statements conflicted with the resident’s account regarding who provided care and what occurred, and the facility did not investigate why staff did not stop care and have another staff member take over when the resident alleged abuse during the episode. The resident continued to report that staff were rough and that their approach to care felt abusive, including prior rough transfers by the same LPN and improper positioning and repositioning by other staff that caused pain and bruising. On the survey date, the resident described ongoing rough care, lack of staff responsiveness to his requests, and feeling that no one listened to or believed him. He reported that staff did not assist him to sit up properly for breakfast, resulting in difficulty eating and spilled food on his shirt. Observation during the interview showed the resident slouched and slumped to the left in his wheelchair, with his left arm hanging over the side, a bruise on his upper arm where the armrest was pressing, and dried oatmeal on his shirt from the morning meal. The resident’s care plan documented a history of false allegations and required care in pairs, investigation of all concerns voiced, and a calm, slow approach, but there was no specific care plan focus addressing his PTSD or his allegations of rough or abusive incontinence care, and the facility did not pursue his ongoing reports of rough and abusive treatment during personal care.

Penalty

Fine: $17,215

The penalty, as released by CMS, applies to the entire inspection this citation is part of, covering all citations and f-tags issued, not just this specific f-tag. For the complete original report, please refer to the 'Details' section.

Summary

The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to provide treatment and care in accordance with professional standards following an unwitnessed fall. A cognitively intact resident with a history of falls, prior fractures (including a right humerus fracture), osteoarthritis, muscle weakness, and difficulty walking was admitted with orders and care plan interventions that included keeping the bed in the lowest position, use of a high-impact fall mat, and a lipped mattress. The resident required maximal assistance with transfers and used a wheelchair. On the night of the incident, the resident was found on the floor on her left side in a somewhat fetal position, partially on and partially off the fall mat, with the bed raised in a high position. RN #1, who heard a loud sound and discovered the resident on the floor, documented an initial assessment that included vital signs showing elevated blood pressure and initiation of neurological monitoring. However, there was no documentation that RN #1 completed a thorough head-to-toe assessment before the resident was moved back to bed, despite facility policy requiring a nurse evaluation to determine presence of injury prior to moving a resident who has fallen. The record lacked evidence of a full assessment of injuries at the time of the fall, even though the resident later was found to have multiple fractures and a scalp contusion. Staff interviews, including from the DON and other nurses, confirmed that standard practice and policy required a complete RN assessment before moving a resident after a fall. Following the fall, RN #1 did not notify the physician, the resident’s representative, or hospice at the time of the incident, despite facility policy and staff statements that the physician and responsible party should be notified immediately after the assessment. The resident’s blood pressure continued to rise over several hours, and she complained of pain, yet the first notification was to hospice at 6:00 a.m., approximately three hours after the fall. The hospice RN arrived around 6:30 a.m., found the resident arousable to verbal stimuli with tense features, facial grimacing, and reporting severe pain, and then notified the on-call physician, who ordered transfer to the hospital. Hospital imaging revealed a left parietotemporal scalp contusion, an acute nondisplaced C7 vertebral fracture, multiple displaced fractures of at least the first six left ribs, a left scapula fracture, and a left clavicle fracture. The facility also failed to ensure the resident’s bed was maintained at a safe, low height as care-planned, and the transfer to the hospital did not occur until after hospice assessment and physician notification several hours post-fall. The resident’s representative reported that the resident lay in bed for three hours in severe pain without medical attention and that the family and physician were not notified by facility staff, but rather by hospice. Documentation showed that the facility did not contact the resident’s representative until later that afternoon, after the hospital had already identified multiple fractures and the resident was being admitted to intensive or trauma care. Staff interviews, including from CNAs, an LPN, an RN, and the DON, consistently described that facility practice required immediate RN assessment before moving a resident, prompt vital signs and neurological checks, and immediate notification of the physician and responsible party after a fall, particularly if there was pain or potential major injury. In this case, the facility failed to accurately and timely assess the resident after the fall, failed to promptly notify the physician and responsible party, did not ensure the bed was at the lowest and safest height, and did not ensure timely transfer to the hospital after an unwitnessed fall that resulted in major injury and pain. The facility’s own fall care plan and incident policy emphasized prevention of avoidable accidents, completion of a nurse evaluation prior to moving a resident who has fallen, and documentation of injury status and notifications. Despite these requirements, the EMR lacked a full head-to-toe assessment at the time of the fall, and the DON acknowledged that RN #1, an agency nurse, failed to document the fall appropriately, complete an accurate assessment, and notify the physician and the resident’s representative. The hospice RN confirmed that RN #1 did not notify the physician or the resident’s representative and that hospice was contacted due to the resident’s increased pain and rising blood pressure. These actions and omissions collectively led to the cited deficiency for failure to provide treatment and care in accordance with professional standards and the resident’s care plan following the fall.

Penalty

Fine: $25,650

The penalty, as released by CMS, applies to the entire inspection this citation is part of, covering all citations and f-tags issued, not just this specific f-tag. For the complete original report, please refer to the 'Details' section.

Summary

The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure an environment free from accident hazards and to provide adequate supervision to prevent accidents, particularly in relation to transportation safety and fall prevention. One resident with vascular dementia, bilateral lower extremity impairments, and dependence on staff for transfers was transported to an outside appointment in a facility vehicle while seated in a wheelchair without foot pedals. During the trip, the resident began sliding forward in the wheelchair. The transportation driver reported he could not immediately pull over while exiting the highway, and by the time he stopped, the resident had slid further forward so that her knees and legs were resting on a step behind the driver’s seat. The resident subsequently exhibited multiple bruises, abrasions, swelling of both legs, and severe pain. Facility records and later hospital documentation identified bilateral tibial fractures associated with this transport incident. The report details that the wheelchair was secured with a four‑point tie‑down, but the resident’s body was not properly restrained. The driver later demonstrated that he had routed the shoulder portion of the seat belt around the back of the van seat instead of across the resident’s shoulders, and placed the lap portion across the resident’s chest instead of her lap. He acknowledged this was not the proper use of the seat belt and attributed his actions in part to concern about disturbing the resident’s ostomy bag. He also stated that the resident was sitting on a blanket and a Hoyer sling, which he believed contributed to sliding, and that the absence of foot pedals left nothing to stop the resident’s forward movement. The facility’s own transportation policy required that drivers and passengers wear seatbelts and shoulder harnesses any time the vehicle was in motion and that wheelchairs be made secure with straps, but there was no evidence that the seat belt system was applied as intended in this case. The report further identifies systemic issues in transportation training and oversight that contributed to the deficiency. The van driver had been in the role for a little over a month and was trained informally by the central supply coordinator, who herself had been trained years earlier by a prior driver without documented competencies, checklists, or reference to an operations manual. The central supply coordinator reported no additional training or competencies since that initial instruction and was unaware of any policy or procedure for driving emergencies or clear guidance on whom the driver should contact for clinical or mechanical emergencies during transport. The maintenance director, responsible for monthly checks of the van, used a generic medical transport checklist, had no van‑specific training or competencies, and was unsure whether an operations manual was available. The administrator acknowledged that she was not sure what competencies the trainer had when she trained the current driver, that the DON and ADON were not trained on transportation, and that no investigation was completed into the driver’s admitted misuse of the seat belt. Collectively, these actions and inactions led to the transportation‑related accident and constituted a failure to maintain an accident‑free environment and adequate supervision. In addition, the deficiency includes failures related to fall management for two other residents at high risk for falls. One resident with vascular dementia, muscle wasting, difficulty walking, and severe cognitive impairment experienced 16 falls over a defined period, including an unwitnessed fall that resulted in a facial laceration and a maxillary sinus fracture requiring emergency department evaluation. The facility had a fall management policy requiring IDT review of falls and individualized care plan interventions, and the resident’s care plan contained multiple fall interventions such as scheduled toileting, prompted voiding, use of a non‑recording video monitor, and assistance with transfers. However, the report notes that care‑planned fall interventions were not consistently implemented in a timely manner, and surveyor observations during the survey period showed that staff were not consistently following the resident’s fall interventions. The report also notes that the IDT did not consistently review falls in a timely manner or ensure that recommended interventions were implemented. For the high‑risk resident with multiple falls, IDT notes documented repeated unwitnessed and witnessed falls associated with poor safety awareness, failure to use the call light, weakness, and attempts to ambulate or transfer without assistance. New interventions such as occupational therapy evaluations, room relocation closer to staff, and pharmacy review were recommended, but one occupational therapy evaluation was recommended after a fall even though it had already been recommended after a prior fall, indicating delays or gaps in implementation. Another resident with multiple falls had no timely identification and documentation of fall interventions after several falls. These patterns demonstrate that the facility did not ensure timely IDT review of falls or consistent implementation of care‑planned fall interventions, contributing to repeated falls and at least one major injury. Overall, the cited deficiency encompasses the facility’s failure to safely transport a dependent, cognitively impaired resident in accordance with its own transportation safety policy, resulting in bilateral tibial fractures, and its failure to consistently implement and timely review fall prevention interventions for residents at high risk for falls, including residents who sustained multiple falls and a serious injury.

Removal Plan

• Temporarily suspend all facility resident transportation services and transfer transportation to an outside company pending completion of training and validation.
• Immediately remove all staff members assigned transportation responsibilities from transportation duties pending completion of retraining and competency validation.
• Transport residents requiring appointments using medical transportation services through external transportation companies.
• Implement a resident transportation risk assessment tool to identify residents who require special transportation precautions; assess all residents who utilize facility transportation using this tool.
• Implement a comprehensive transportation safety program including: updated Transportation Safety Policy; Transportation Driver Job Description with defined safety duties; Transportation Staff Competency Validation process; Pre-Transport Safety Checklist (reviewed by administrator or designee); Transportation Special Circumstances Protocol; Transportation Incident Investigation Template; Transportation Safety Training Program; and Transportation Safety QAPI Monitoring Process.
• Require wheelchairs to be secured using a four-point tie-down system.
• Require residents to be secured with lap and shoulder seatbelts.
• Verify wheelchair brakes and foot pedals prior to transport by the administrator or designee.
• Confirm resident stability before departure by the administrator or designee.
• Evaluate residents’ medical devices/special medical circumstances individually (e.g., ostomies, indwelling urinary catheters, suprapubic catheters, oxygen equipment, other devices) and implement appropriate precautions prior to transportation as necessary.
• Provide mandatory transportation safety training for all transportation staff (wheelchair securement, restraint placement, medical device accommodations, emergency response); document attendance and validate competency using a checklist, with validation by the maintenance director and clinical liaison/designee as approved by the administrator.
• Complete a Pre-Transport Safety Checklist prior to each transport verifying wheelchair brakes engaged, foot pedals attached, four-point tie-down secured, lap and shoulder restraints applied, medical devices protected, and resident stability confirmed (completed by Maintenance Director and Clinical Liaison/Designee).
• Use a transportation incident ad hoc QAPI tool to ensure structured review of any transportation-related incident (incident description, equipment review, root cause analysis, corrective action planning).

Penalty

Fine: $53,550

The penalty, as released by CMS, applies to the entire inspection this citation is part of, covering all citations and f-tags issued, not just this specific f-tag. For the complete original report, please refer to the 'Details' section.

Summary

The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure that a resident with multiple complex medical conditions received treatment and care in accordance with professional standards of practice following a clear change in condition related to alcohol intoxication. The resident had diagnoses including alcoholic polyneuropathy, history of traumatic brain injury, CHF, type 2 diabetes mellitus, alcoholic cirrhosis of the liver, hypertension, long-term anticoagulant use, and alcohol use with an unspecified alcohol-induced disorder. His MDS showed severe cognitive impairment and functional dependence for many ADLs, though he typically ambulated without a mobility device. Physician orders included monitoring for potential substance use each shift and documenting and notifying the physician if any substance use indicators were noted, but the January TAR documented no substance use behaviors for that month. On the day of the incident, the resident signed out of the facility in the morning and was later found outside the facility grounds by bystanders, yelling for help and lying on the ground near a hotel with a shopping cart. Police dispatch records show multiple calls reporting the resident on the ground and yelling for help, and the police ultimately identified him and returned him to the facility. The police reported to staff that the resident was intoxicated and had been wandering. Upon return, he required wheelchair transport from the front door to his room, despite normally walking without assistive devices. According to an IDT note, officers assisted him in removing his shoes and coat and helped him into bed, after which he was observed resting in his room, but no time or assessment details were documented. Record review revealed no documentation that nursing staff completed a change of condition assessment, a post-fall or post-ground-level event assessment, or any RN assessment when the resident was returned by police in an intoxicated state. There was no documentation of vital signs, head-to-toe assessment, skin evaluation, or monitoring between the time of his return and the time he was later found unresponsive. The physician and the resident’s legal guardian were not notified of his intoxication or change in condition, and there was no progress note describing his condition upon return or how he was transferred to bed. The resident’s comprehensive care plan contained no care plan addressing alcohol use, intoxication, or potential substance use, and there were no interventions related to his known history of alcohol abuse and drinking while away from the facility. Staff interviews, including with the DON/acting NHA, ADON, and RNs, confirmed that no change of condition assessment, vital signs, or physician/guardian notifications were completed despite their own descriptions of what should occur when a resident returns intoxicated. The resident was later found face down on the floor in his room, unresponsive, and was pronounced dead; his death certificate listed respiratory failure, aspiration event, and alcoholism as the causes of death. The facility also failed to promptly recognize and investigate the incident as an unexpected death associated with a significant change in condition. A frequent visitor reported that the DON/acting NHA initially did not believe an occurrence report was required for the resident’s intoxicated return and unexpected death, and the occurrence report to the state was not submitted until eight days after the death. There was no evidence of an immediate, thorough internal investigation or root cause analysis at the time of the event to determine why nurses did not complete a change in condition assessment or follow the existing physician order to monitor for substance use and notify the physician. Surveyors determined that the facility did not thoroughly assess and monitor the resident’s alcohol use and change in condition, did not document changes, and did not seek medical treatment or notify the physician and guardian when required, and that these failures contributed to serious harm and death for the resident.

Removal Plan

• NHA notified the facility medical director of the incident.
• Nursing supervisors/designees completed physical assessments/interviews on all residents to identify any changes in condition and notified the physician of any noted changes.
• Initiated a look-back audit of current and discharged residents to ensure change-of-condition policy was followed.
• Identified one current resident without a required 72-hour alert monitoring order; educated the assigned nurse regarding timely initiation of the 72-hour alert monitoring order after completing the eINTERACT change-in-condition evaluation.
• Initiated the missing 72-hour change-in-condition alert monitoring order for the identified resident, including nursing assessments and documentation on the TAR and in progress notes each shift for three days per physician-indicated frequency.
• Reviewed resident change-in-condition and notification policies/procedures for clinical accuracy.
• Educated all nursing staff on addressing changes of condition (assessment, monitoring, physician/family notification, orders, and facility policies/procedures); staff were not permitted to work a shift until education was completed.
• Educated new hires (licensed nurses and nurse aides) during orientation on change-of-condition and physician/family notification requirements and facility policies/procedures.
• DON/designee to conduct audits five times per week for three months of the 24-hour report and progress note report to ensure change-of-condition policies/procedures are followed.
• DON/designee to conduct daily nursing staff huddles Monday through Friday to monitor for changes in resident condition.
• Regional director of clinical services and regional vice president to provide clinical/administrative oversight to ensure education and audits are completed and accurate.
• DON educated by the CNO on appropriately addressing changes of condition (assessment, monitoring, physician orders, and facility policies/procedures).
• DON/designee to complete chart audits to verify detailed assessments/documentation and physician/family notification related to changes of condition.
• Regional Director of Clinical Services to visit the facility to provide general oversight and monitoring of the plan.

Penalty

Fine: $14,015

The penalty, as released by CMS, applies to the entire inspection this citation is part of, covering all citations and f-tags issued, not just this specific f-tag. For the complete original report, please refer to the 'Details' section.

Summary

The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure a resident was free from accident hazards and received adequate supervision when provided a hot beverage. A resident with diagnoses including a displaced intertrochanteric fracture of the left femur with routine healing, unspecified cataract, unspecified macular degeneration, disorientation, and restlessness and agitation requested very hot tea. The resident had moderate cognitive impairment with a BIMS score of 11 and was care planned as needing set-up assistance with eating and drinking. Although an MDS assessment indicated adequate vision without corrective lenses, subsequent care planning documented vision impairment related to cataracts, macular degeneration, and diplopia, and that the resident wore an eye patch and glasses. On the day of the incident, the resident asked a physical therapy assistant (PTA) to make her tea “very hot.” The PTA dispensed hot water for tea from the kitchenette coffee machine and then heated the beverage in a microwave for an additional 30 seconds at the resident’s request. The PTA then secured a lid on the cup and placed it on the resident’s bedside table. The facility’s Hot Beverage policy, in effect at the time, stated that hot beverages were to be served at a safe, palatable temperature, that hot beverage machines were to be set and maintained at manufacturer-recommended temperatures, and that microwaves were not to be used to reheat hot beverages if the temperature was not considered palatable; instead, a fresh cup was to be poured. The policy also directed staff to report safety or decline in managing hot beverages to the IDT or therapy for review and possible care plan updates. After the PTA placed the lidded cup at the bedside, the visually impaired resident attempted to drink the tea but could not locate the opening in the lid due to her macular degeneration. The resident then attempted to remove the lid independently, during which the hot tea spilled onto her right forearm and right posterior thigh. Nursing assessment documented bright red, blanchable burns with a broken blister on the arm, and measurements of 8 cm by 5 cm on the arm and 12 cm by 22 cm on the thigh. The NP assessed the injuries as second-degree partial thickness burns involving approximately 6% total body surface area, with the resident reporting pain of 3 out of 10 and denying numbness, tingling, fevers, or chills. Subsequent documentation showed the wounds progressing with scabbing and epithelial tissue formation prior to the resident’s discharge home. Staff interviews confirmed that, following the incident, it was recognized that the tea had been heated beyond the temperature at which it was dispensed from the coffee machine and that the resident’s impaired vision contributed to her difficulty using the standard lidded cup. The DON and RN stated that the PTA had reheated the tea in the microwave without checking the temperature and then served it to the resident, contrary to the facility’s policy prohibiting reheating of facility-provided drinks in microwaves. The dietary manager and nursing staff also indicated that the facility’s practice was to avoid reheating hot beverages and to rely on the coffee machine settings, which were kept at or below 160°F, rather than using microwaves for additional heating. These actions and inactions led to the resident being provided an excessively hot beverage in a manner that did not account for her visual impairment, resulting in the burn injury. The facility’s failure centered on not adhering to its own Hot Beverage policy and not adequately supervising or accommodating the resident’s known visual impairment when providing a very hot beverage. The PTA’s use of the microwave to further heat the tea, the absence of a temperature check before serving, and the placement of a standard lid that the visually impaired resident could not safely manage independently all contributed to the incident. The care plan at the time identified the resident as needing set-up assistance and, after the incident, was updated to include interventions such as encouraging the resident to leave lids on hot beverages and to use the call light for assistance with lids, indicating that these precautions were not in place or not implemented at the time of the burn event.

Penalty

Fine: $53,550

The penalty, as released by CMS, applies to the entire inspection this citation is part of, covering all citations and f-tags issued, not just this specific f-tag. For the complete original report, please refer to the 'Details' section.

Summary

The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure a resident was free from significant medication errors when a diuretic, metolazone, was entered and administered as a scheduled daily medication instead of as a PRN medication with specific weight-based parameters. After an acute hospitalization for conditions including acute on chronic CHF, acute respiratory failure with hypoxia, COPD, atrial fibrillation, hypertension, morbid obesity, COVID-19, and MDRO history, the resident was readmitted to the facility. The hospital discharge order specified metolazone 2.5 mg to be taken once daily as needed for pulmonary edema due to chronic heart failure, only when the resident had a weight gain of 5 lbs over baseline, and to be given 30 minutes prior to Lasix. However, when the orders were transcribed into the facility’s EMR on readmission, metolazone was entered as a scheduled daily medication without PRN parameters, and this incorrect order did not match the hospital discharge instructions. The assistant DON, who entered the readmission orders from the hard-copy discharge packet because the phone lines were down and the usual electronic admission process was not used, input metolazone as a daily scheduled medication. The normal process of having two nurses verify and enter orders was not completed; the ADON entered the orders alone, and the second nurse verification did not occur. As a result, nursing staff administered metolazone 2.5 mg daily for eight days, in addition to the resident’s other diuretics (Lasix and spironolactone), without confirming that the resident had experienced the required 5 lb weight gain from baseline. The MAR documented daily administration of metolazone over this period, including on days when no weight was obtained, and on days when the resident’s weight was stable or decreasing rather than increasing. During this time, the resident experienced significant weight loss and symptoms consistent with a change in condition. Weight records showed a decline from approximately 190 lbs prior to hospitalization to 176.6 lbs when the error was identified, reflecting a loss of about 12–14 lbs over a short period. The resident and her representative reported that she became severely weak, excessively tired, and felt she could not regain her strength, with the representative describing the resident as very tired, exhausted, and feeling as though she could not “hang on any longer.” Clinical documentation noted significant weakness, excessive sleepiness during therapy, and that the resident was triggering for significant weight loss. Laboratory testing later showed hypokalemia, with a potassium level of 3.2 mEq/L. Interviews with nursing staff, the DON, the ADON, the PCP, the pharmacist, the resident, and the resident’s representative consistently attributed the resident’s weight loss, weakness, and low potassium at least in part to the erroneous daily administration of metolazone instead of PRN dosing based on weight gain. The facility’s own medication error policy defined a medication error as preparation or administration of medications not in accordance with the prescriber’s order, manufacturer’s specifications, or accepted professional standards, and defined a significant medication error as one that causes resident discomfort or jeopardizes health and safety. In this case, the metolazone order in the EMR did not reflect the prescriber’s PRN order with weight-based parameters, and the medication was administered without verifying the required 5 lb weight gain. The resident’s care plan for diuretic therapy called for administering diuretics as ordered, monitoring for side effects such as fatigue and increased fall risk, and reporting pertinent lab results, including potassium. Staff interviews acknowledged that the error persisted for about eight days, that medication reconciliation was not completed upon readmission, and that the lack of a second nurse verification contributed to the error. The pharmacist and PCP described the effects of metolazone, especially in combination with Lasix, as including electrolyte abnormalities, weight loss, and weakness, and characterized the error as moderate, with the potential to increase electrolyte depletion and require close monitoring.

Penalty

Fine: $53,550

The penalty, as released by CMS, applies to the entire inspection this citation is part of, covering all citations and f-tags issued, not just this specific f-tag. For the complete original report, please refer to the 'Details' section.

Summary

The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to designate a registered nurse (RN) to serve as the full-time director of nursing (DON) while the existing DON was reassigned to act as the temporary emergency licensed nursing home administrator (NHA). Record review showed that the acting NHA held an active temporary permit for emergency situations beginning on 12/30/25 and expiring on 3/30/26. A staffing list review revealed there was no full-time DON in the building during this period. The DON job description, signed by the DON, specified that the DON’s primary purpose was to plan, organize, develop, and direct nursing operations, ensure quality resident care on a 24-hour basis, oversee recruitment and hiring of licensed personnel, manage nursing schedules, monitor staffing levels, and oversee implementation of nursing service objectives, policies, and procedures, including key clinical systems such as infection prevention and control, psychotropic and controlled substance management, skin and weight systems, risk management, and hospice liaison. Staff interviews confirmed that the individual serving as the full-time temporary NHA was also functioning as the full-time DON, with no other person appointed to the DON role. The chief nursing officer stated that the temporary NHA was also acting as the full-time DON and reported not knowing there was a regulation preventing this. Nursing staff, including an LPN and an RN, reported they were unaware that the DON had been appointed as the temporary NHA and continued to view the DON as their supervisor. The acting NHA described performing both administrative and clinical leadership duties, including occurrence reporting to the state, serving as abuse coordinator and investigator, and leading stand-up meetings, while relying on two unit managers, an LPN assistant DON, and an infection preventionist to assist with clinical duties and audits. There had been no announcement to staff, residents, or families about the acting NHA appointment or her role as abuse coordinator, and there was no signage indicating this responsibility.

Penalty

Fine: $53,550

The penalty, as released by CMS, applies to the entire inspection this citation is part of, covering all citations and f-tags issued, not just this specific f-tag. For the complete original report, please refer to the 'Details' section.

Summary

The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to maintain an effective, comprehensive, data‑driven QAPI program that identified and addressed quality of care concerns, particularly related to changes in resident condition. The facility’s QAPI policy required ongoing tracking and measuring of performance, identification and prioritization of quality deficiencies, systematic analysis of underlying causes, and development and monitoring of corrective actions, with a focus on resident safety, health outcomes, and high‑risk or problem‑prone areas. Despite this written policy, the facility did not operate its QA program in a manner that prevented repeat deficiencies, as evidenced by prior citations at F684 (quality of care) in consecutive annual recertification surveys. Surveyors found that the QAPI committee failed to identify and address concerns related to quality of care by not ensuring that resident changes in condition were assessed, monitored, documented, and communicated when indicated. This failure rose to the level of immediate jeopardy and was associated with a serious adverse outcome resulting in a resident’s death. The cross‑referenced F684 citation states that the facility failed to provide quality care by not assessing, monitoring, documenting, and communicating a resident’s change in condition when indicated. The facility’s regulatory history showed that F684 had been cited twice previously at a D scope and severity, indicating a potential for more than minimal harm, isolated, without effective QA‑driven prevention of recurrence. Interviews further demonstrated gaps in the QAPI program’s functioning and oversight. The medical director reported he visited at least twice a month, reviewed cases and policies presented to him, and made changes based on what was brought forward in QAPI, but he was not informed that the DON was also serving as the full‑time temporary emergency licensed NHA for several months, and he described multiple leadership changes. The DON/acting NHA stated that QAPI meetings were held monthly and covered standard topics such as admissions, discharges, falls, staffing, abuse, infection control, and grievances, with use of audit tools and tracking spreadsheets. However, she acknowledged that while change of condition evaluations were being done for skin alterations and falls, staff were “new to the other types of change of condition assessments” that required thorough assessment and notification of the physician and family/guardian, and that change of condition evaluations beyond those limited areas had not been a focus of QAPI until after the incident that led to the immediate jeopardy finding.

Penalty

Fine: $14,015

The penalty, as released by CMS, applies to the entire inspection this citation is part of, covering all citations and f-tags issued, not just this specific f-tag. For the complete original report, please refer to the 'Details' section.

Summary

The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to reasonably accommodate a resident’s needs and preferences during a room change, specifically by not providing timely assistance with moving the resident’s personal belongings. The facility’s Room Change policy, revised April 2025, states that environmental services staff or a designee will assist residents to pack their belongings prior to a room change, and nursing staff will assist residents to unpack belongings and get settled into the new room. The policy does not specify who will physically move the belongings between rooms, but staff interviews indicated an expectation that environmental services, nursing, or maintenance staff would typically assist with moving items or furniture. The resident involved was under age 65 and had multiple diagnoses, including CVA with left-sided hemiparesis and spastic hemiplegia, coronary artery disease, hyperlipidemia, depression, ADHD, lower back pain, and muscle weakness. The resident was cognitively intact with a BIMS score of 15, used a wheelchair for mobility, and was independent with hygiene, toileting, bathing, and dressing, but required setup and cleanup assistance with eating. The resident had documented verbal behavioral symptoms such as yelling and cursing, and a behavior care plan that included communicating via email and following up on concerns in a timely manner. The resident reported irritation of the nose and eyes and refused to return to her original room after complaining of a strong smell of ammonia and bleach, and staff assisted her into another room that night so she could sleep. Following this move, the resident requested assistance from staff to bring toiletries, a plant, and other personal items from the original room to the new room. Progress notes documented that staff told the resident they were not allowed to move her belongings and could only accompany her while she moved them herself, despite her left-sided hemiplegia and inability to move the items independently. The resident stated she was told she needed to move the items herself or arrange for someone else to move them and that she felt she should not have to pay to move her own items because the facility had offered the room change. Email communications show that the NHA characterized the room change as an accommodation requested by the resident and informed her that, due to prior concerns about staff handling her property, her belongings should be moved by family, an authorized representative, or a third-party mover at her own expense, with staff only providing access and oversight. The resident agreed to permanently move to the new room, but most of her belongings remained in the previous room, and staff continued to only escort her to retrieve items herself. Staff interviews confirmed that, in typical room changes, families or staff would assist with moving belongings, and that in this case the facility did not expect the resident to move her own items but also did not provide direct assistance or documented resources for moving services. The permanent move of the resident’s belongings did not occur until 39 days after she agreed to the room transfer, during which time the majority of her personal items remained in the original room.