Oak Ridge Care Center
Inspection history, citations, penalties and survey trends for this long-term care facility in Union Grove, Wisconsin.
- Location
- 1400 8th Ave, Union Grove, Wisconsin 53182
- CMS Provider Number
- 525542
- Inspections on file
- 23
- Latest survey
- October 28, 2025
- Citations (last 12 mo.)
- 3 (1 serious)
Citation history
Health deficiencies cited at Oak Ridge Care Center during CMS and state inspections, most recent first.
Three residents at risk for or with pressure injuries did not receive necessary care, including timely RN assessment, care plan updates, and implementation of aggressive interventions such as repositioning and use of support surfaces. One resident developed a stage 4 pressure injury that became infected and required surgical debridement after the facility failed to revise the care plan or implement alternative interventions when the resident refused an air mattress. Other residents were not consistently repositioned or assessed according to their care plans, and the facility did not follow its own wound management policy.
Surveyors identified that five CNAs did not have documented completion of the required 12 hours of annual in-service training, as the facility lacked a system to track or verify individual training records. Available documentation was incomplete or not properly dated, and leadership confirmed there was no process to ensure compliance with training requirements, potentially affecting all residents.
A registered nurse did not perform hand hygiene or change gloves before applying a clean dressing to a resident's stage 4 sacral pressure wound after coming into contact with the wound during care, contrary to facility policy and CDC guidelines. This lapse was observed by a surveyor and confirmed through staff interviews.
A resident expressed feelings of depression and self-harm, but the facility failed to provide necessary support, leading to the resident's death. Despite policy requirements for immediate intervention, staff delayed action, misinterpreting the resident's statements. This neglect resulted in a finding of immediate jeopardy.
A resident on Coumadin was not monitored with necessary lab tests, leading to over anticoagulation and subsequent death. The facility failed to ensure ongoing lab testing, resulting in critical lab values and signs of bleeding being overlooked. Staff interviews revealed systemic failures in monitoring and managing the resident's medication therapy.
A resident died of a presumed suicide, and the facility failed to conduct a thorough investigation as required by its policies. The resident was found with a plastic bag over their head and oxygen tubing around their neck. The facility only gathered statements from three staff members, and no resident interviews were conducted, leading to a deficiency in the investigation process.
A resident with unspecified dementia and severely impaired cognitive skills received another resident's anti-seizure and laxative medications due to a student nurse's error. The medications included Depakote, Keppra, and lactulose. The resident was monitored for drowsiness and aspiration but did not have an adverse reaction. The nurse instructor was subsequently barred from the facility.
A resident with dementia and a Stage 4 pressure injury was found with her air mattress unplugged for over two hours, leading to a rapid deterioration of her condition. The care plan to ensure the air mattress was plugged in was not followed, as confirmed by the Director of Nurses.
Failure to Prevent and Manage Pressure Injuries
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to provide necessary treatment and services to prevent the development and promote the healing of pressure injuries for three residents who were either at risk for or had existing pressure injuries. One resident was admitted without any pressure injuries but was assessed as at risk. Ten days after admission, this resident developed a blister on the left buttock that was not assessed by a Registered Nurse, and the care plan was not revised when the area declined. Aggressive interventions, such as repositioning, were not implemented even after the resident refused an air mattress. The wound continued to deteriorate, eventually becoming infected and requiring antibiotics and surgical debridement, after which it was staged as a stage 4 pressure injury. The facility's documentation and care planning were inconsistent and incomplete. There was a lack of comprehensive assessment and timely updates to care plans following changes in the residents' conditions. For the resident who developed the stage 4 pressure injury, there was no evidence of a Registered Nurse or physician assessment upon discovery of the wound, and the care plan did not address repositioning or alternative interventions after the resident refused the air mattress. Additionally, there was no documentation of the resident refusing to be repositioned, and no interventions were added to address this aspect of care. The facility also failed to assess or offer alternative support surfaces beyond the standard mattress and air mattress. Other residents at risk for or with pressure injuries were also not consistently repositioned according to their care plans, as observed by surveyors and reported by family members. One resident was not repositioned during multiple observations, and another was readmitted without a comprehensive assessment of their pressure injury and was not offloaded or repositioned as required. The facility's own wound management policy, which requires comprehensive assessment and interdisciplinary care planning, was not followed, contributing to the deficient practice.
Failure to Document and Track Required CNA In-Service Training
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to maintain documentation showing that five reviewed Certified Nursing Assistants (CNAs) completed the required 12 hours of annual in-service training, as mandated by facility policy and federal regulations. During interviews and record reviews, surveyors found that the facility did not keep individual records of completed training for CNAs, and the available documentation, such as sign-in sheets and quizzes, was incomplete, undated, or lacked necessary signatures. The spreadsheet provided by the Executive Director listed education topics and hours but did not align with the rolling 12-month period based on each CNA's hire date, making it impossible to verify compliance for the required timeframe. When asked, the Director of Nursing acknowledged that there was no system in place to monitor or track the completion of required training for each employee. The lack of proper documentation and tracking potentially affected all 71 residents in the facility, as there was no assurance that CNAs had received ongoing education in critical areas such as dementia care and abuse prevention. The deficiency was identified through a review of employee files and direct communication with facility leadership, who confirmed the absence of a reliable process to ensure and document annual training compliance.
Failure to Perform Hand Hygiene During Wound Care
Penalty
Summary
During a wound care procedure for a resident with multiple pressure ulcers, including a stage 4 sacral pressure wound and other significant comorbidities such as osteomyelitis and diabetes, a registered nurse failed to follow established infection prevention and control protocols. Specifically, after cleansing the wound and applying calcium alginate, the nurse did not change gloves or perform hand hygiene before placing a new border dressing on the wound. This action was observed by a surveyor, who noted that the nurse had come into contact with the wound and its exudate prior to applying the clean dressing, thereby not adhering to both facility policy and CDC guidelines for hand hygiene during wound care. Facility policies require hand hygiene before and after wound care, after glove removal, and when moving from a soiled to a clean body site. The CDC also recommends hand hygiene immediately before touching a patient, after contact with blood or body fluids, and after glove removal. The nurse's failure to perform hand hygiene at the appropriate step during the dressing change was confirmed through observation and staff interviews, which indicated that staff are expected to follow these protocols during wound care procedures.
Failure to Address Resident's Mental Health Needs Leads to Tragic Outcome
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to provide medically related social services to a resident, leading to a finding of immediate jeopardy. The resident, identified as R4, reported feeling depressed and having thoughts of self-harm almost daily. Despite these alarming statements, the facility did not provide the necessary support or services to address these concerns. Approximately eight hours after expressing these thoughts, R4 was found deceased with a plastic bag over his head and oxygen tubing wrapped around his neck. The facility's policy required immediate intervention when a resident voiced intent to harm themselves, including initiating 1:1 care, conducting 15-minute checks, and possibly sending the resident to the hospital. However, these steps were not taken for R4. The Advanced Practice Social Worker (APSW) was informed of R4's statements but chose to delay action until the next day, citing the end of the workday as the reason. This inaction was compounded by a lack of documentation and communication among staff regarding R4's mental health status. Interviews with staff revealed a misunderstanding and misinterpretation of R4's statements, with some staff believing the statements were taken out of context due to R4's age and demeanor. This misjudgment led to a failure to recognize the resident's responses as a cry for help and to implement necessary interventions. The facility's neglect to address R4's mental health needs and the subsequent tragic outcome resulted in a finding of immediate jeopardy.
Failure to Monitor Anticoagulation Therapy Leads to Resident's Death
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to ensure that a resident, identified as R2, who was receiving Coumadin, an anticoagulation medication, was monitored with ongoing laboratory testing to maintain a therapeutic dose. R2 was admitted with an order for Coumadin, which requires frequent lab tests to ensure proper dosing. However, the last test was conducted on a specific date, and no further tests were ordered. This oversight led to R2 developing multiple bruises, a sign of over anticoagulation, which went unnoticed by both nursing and pharmacy staff. R2's condition worsened, and he developed hematuria, indicating potential internal bleeding. Subsequent lab tests revealed critical low hemoglobin and hematocrit levels, along with critically high prothrombin time and INR, confirming over anticoagulation. Despite these alarming results, there was no evidence of a standing order for PT/INR tests, and the facility failed to monitor R2's condition adequately. This lack of monitoring and failure to act on the signs of over anticoagulation resulted in R2 being sent to the hospital, where he later died. Interviews with facility staff, including the Director of Nursing, Registered Pharmacist, Medical Director, and Advanced Practice Nurse Practitioner, revealed a systemic failure in monitoring and managing R2's Coumadin therapy. The staff acknowledged the absence of specific orders for monitoring Coumadin side effects and lab work, and the pharmacy's failure to notice the lack of lab tests. The Medical Director admitted that the incident was a system failure, and the facility had to revise their anticoagulation policy following the incident.
Removal Plan
- The facility began an investigation and identified all residents in the building who could potentially be affected and ensured that all labs and medications were up-to-date and accurate.
- The leadership team, including the NHA A, DON B, ADON L, ANHA F, MedDir K, Nurse Manager, and Quality Care Coordinator conducted an Ad-Hoc Quality Assurance and Performance Improvement (QAPI) meeting. The passing of the resident was reviewed.
- The anticoagulation policy was reviewed and updated to ensure resident safety. The policy was adjusted to include standing orders for residents on Coumadin for weekly PT/INR draws upon admission to the facility.
- The team decided to add new monitoring orders upon admission, including monitoring for signs or symptoms for bleeding.
- A Coumadin log was initiated by the nurse manager team for daily review during clinical meetings. At each clinical meeting, the clinical team reviews all residents who are prescribed Coumadin.
- The facility's pharmacy was contacted and a medication audit for all residents in the facility was completed. No other medication issues were discovered during this facility-wide medication audit. The pharmacy continues with monthly audits for all residents, and the residents on Coumadin are being monitored routinely by the pharmacy.
- New admissions to the facility will have a prospective medication review completed by the pharmacy and the pharmacy will make note of medication that requires close monitoring. The consultant pharmacist will evaluate residents on Coumadin and clinically determine if INRs are being monitored routinely. Clinical judgement with regard to past stability of patient INR's will determine if consultant pharmacist recommends an INR for a resident for that month.
- DON B began education on Coumadin with the nursing staff. All nursing staff were educated and provided with information about Coumadin. After reading and having a discussion, staff independently completed a quiz to show competency. The DON held small groups to complete this education with the nurses; additionally, the nurses were informed that if they had additional questions or concerns, they should seek out information from DON B or the ADON L accordingly. The staff were then informed about the changes being implemented regarding Coumadin.
- The nursing staff's admission checklist and requirements include standing orders for weekly PT/INR draws for residents with Coumadin prescribed. Education began and all staff were educated before they began working their next shift on the floor. The nursing department had been educated about Coumadin and informed of the Anticoagulation policy and procedure. Upon hire, new staff members are now trained on this policy during their training period at orientation.
- The team had contacted all parties involved to address the issue and make needed corrections. The plans put in place have thus far ensured that this mistake is prevented from occurring again. No other residents were affected, and the updated policy and procedure will keep residents safe. The facility made the necessary corrections and began monitoring immediately.
Failure to Investigate Resident's Death
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to thoroughly investigate the death of a resident, identified as R4, who died of a presumed suicide. The facility's policy on the investigation and reporting of alleged incidents of abuse, neglect, and misappropriation requires all alleged violations to be taken seriously and investigated. However, the documentation and medical records for R4 did not show evidence of a thorough investigation into the resident's death, including interviews with all staff and residents about possible causes. R4 was admitted with diagnoses including fractures and was last seen alive by a nurse at 10:45 PM, who confirmed the resident was breathing. At 11:25 PM, a CNA found R4 with a plastic bag over his head and oxygen tubing tightly wrapped around his neck, and the resident was nonresponsive and not breathing. The facility's response to the incident included notifying the Director of Nursing, Assistant Nursing Home Administrator, and Nursing Home Administrator, as well as calling the police and the Medical Examiner, who determined the cause of death as probable suicide. The Assistant Nursing Home Administrator confirmed that the only actions taken were gathering statements from three staff members present with R4, and no statements were taken from other residents. The Sheriff's office collected statements from the staff involved. The lack of a comprehensive investigation into the resident's death constitutes a deficiency in the facility's adherence to its own policies and procedures for handling such incidents.
Significant Medication Error Involving a Resident
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to ensure accurate medication administration for one of three residents, resulting in a significant medication error. The resident, who was admitted with unspecified dementia and assessed as having severely impaired cognitive skills, received another resident's anti-seizure and laxative medications in error. This error was made by a student nurse under the supervision of her instructor. The medications administered in error included Depakote 875 mg, Keppra 500 mg, and lactulose 45 ml/30 g. The physician's action was to monitor the resident for drowsiness and aspiration. Despite the error, the resident did not experience an adverse reaction. Following the incident, the nurse instructor was not allowed back in the facility.
Failure to Prevent and Treat Pressure Injuries
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to provide necessary care and services to prevent the development and promote the healing of pressure injuries for a resident with a Stage 4 pressure injury. The resident, who was admitted with dementia and receiving hospice services, was observed in bed with her air mattress unplugged for over two hours. This lapse in care was verified by the Director of Nurses, who subsequently plugged in the air mattress, allowing it to inflate. The resident's pressure injury, initially noted as moisture-associated dermatitis, had rapidly deteriorated to a Stage 4 pressure injury, as assessed by the wound physician. The resident's care plan, which included ensuring the air mattress was plugged in and set to the appropriate weight setting, was not followed. The wound physician indicated that due to the resident's condition and rapid deterioration, the goal was to keep the resident as comfortable as possible. The deficiency was confirmed through observation, interview, and record review, and was shared with the facility's Administrator and Director of Nurses, who did not provide additional information when requested.
Latest citations in Wisconsin
Two residents did not receive skin care and monitoring consistent with professional standards or their expressed preferences. One resident sustained a right knee abrasion from a fall that was noted on a fall report but not reflected in subsequent weekly skin assessments, MAR/TAR entries, or progress notes; the resident later showed the surveyor a visible wound and reported that staff had not followed up after the initial fall. Nursing staff gave conflicting accounts about the existence and monitoring of this wound, and the DON was unaware of it and unable to describe its progression, while relying on CNAs to observe and report changes. Another resident developed a U-shaped area on the left back that a CNA described as a previously bruised, weeping area and a family member described as a bruise, yet weekly skin checks continued to document intact skin with no open areas and no specific description of this site. A later photo taken by the DON showed a U-shaped scar on the back, but there were no prior measurements, photos, or detailed documentation to track its development or characteristics.
Two residents experienced deficiencies in transfer safety when staff did not follow or update care-planned transfer methods. One resident with CVA and hemiplegia, care-planned for a Lumex transfer with two staff, was transferred by a single RN using the Lumex and was lowered to the floor when unable to continue standing. Another resident with MS, CVA, and severely impaired cognition, care-planned for pivot disc transfers with one staff, was observed being transferred with a Lumex by a CNA, despite the care plan not being revised to reflect this method and no documented therapy re-assessment for renewed Lumex use.
A resident with stroke-related hemiplegia and documented colonization with carbapenem-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa (CRPA) was care-planned for Enhanced Barrier Precautions (EBP), and the facility’s policy required gown and glove use for high-contact activities such as transfers. Despite EBP signage on the door and PPE available, a CNA and the NHA transferred the resident with a mechanical lift, physically holding and positioning the resident, without wearing gowns or gloves, and then continued tasks in the room. In interviews, the CNA, NHA, and DON stated they believed EBP applied only to direct care and did not include transfers, resulting in noncompliance with the facility’s infection prevention and control program.
A resident was admitted to hospice, which the facility’s DON identified as a significant change in condition requiring a Significant Change in Status Assessment (SCSA) MDS to be completed within 14 days per the RAI User Manual and facility policy. The last MDS for this resident had been completed earlier, and although an SCSA was started after the hospice admission, it was never completed or submitted. The resident later died, and the DON acknowledged that the significant change MDS was not completed within the required timeframe.
A resident with obesity, weakness, and type 2 DM with polyneuropathy, who had no cognitive impairment and required a sit-to-stand mechanical lift with two-person assist per the care plan, experienced a fall during a transfer when a CNA performed the lift alone. The CNA unhooked one side of the sling, had difficulty reaching the other side, unlocked the lift while the resident was partially on the bed with feet on the device and holding a trapeze, and the lift moved forward as the resident pushed with their legs, causing the resident to slide to the floor. Staff interviews confirmed that transfer requirements are obtained from the care plan/Kardex, that mechanical lifts may require two staff depending on the plan, and that this resident specifically required two-person assistance, but only one CNA was present at the time of the fall.
The facility failed to maintain required RN coverage and a full-time DON, resulting in no RN on duty for multiple days and no documented RN supervision of nursing staff. In this context, LPNs completed admission and readmission assessments for several residents with complex conditions such as diabetes, COPD, CHF, sepsis, ESRD, and osteomyelitis, and administered IV antibiotics, including via PICC lines, sometimes without appropriate IV certification. CMA/MTs independently assessed pain, administered PRN oxycodone, and injected insulin for a resident with diabetes and pressure ulcers, all without an RN employed to provide direct supervision. Leadership acknowledged reliance on LPNs and CMAs for these functions and on off-site or sister-facility DONs for support, but could not provide documentation of on-site RN coverage, leading surveyors to cite an immediate jeopardy deficiency.
A resident with COPD, emphysema, and leukemia, who was cognitively intact, reported shortness of breath and wheezing and received a PRN nebulizer treatment documented as effective, but no vital signs or comprehensive respiratory assessment were completed. Later, the resident told an LPN that she might need to go to the hospital due to ongoing shortness of breath; the LPN acknowledged this but did not immediately assess the resident, citing that the resident often complained and did not appear in dire need. The resident and her family member reported that she clearly requested to go to the hospital and that staff did not act, leading the family member to call 911. EMS transferred the resident to the hospital, where she was found to be hypoxic and was diagnosed with acute hypoxic respiratory failure, chronic PE, and bronchiectasis with acute lower respiratory infection.
A resident with a history of lumbar discitis/osteomyelitis and chronic myeloid leukemia had IV daptomycin discontinued after imaging showed improvement, and an ID physician faxed new orders for PO levofloxacin and PO vancomycin. Although the fax was confirmed as received and scanned, nursing did not transcribe these antibiotics into the EMR or MAR, and they were not administered for approximately two months, even as the resident reported to the ID physician via telehealth that she was tolerating levofloxacin, believing she was taking it. The oral antibiotic orders did not appear in the physician order listing until after the resident was hospitalized again for fever and pain, when imaging showed recurrent discitis/osteomyelitis and the hospital continued or resumed levofloxacin and PO vancomycin. In a separate incident, an LPN administered another resident’s IV ertapenem instead of the ordered IV daptomycin to this resident after taking the wrong medication from the refrigerator, contrary to facility policies requiring medications to be administered according to physician orders and pending orders to be checked and confirmed after physician visits.
The facility failed to provide enough qualified nursing staff and allowed improper delegation of nursing and medication tasks. On an evening shift, only three CNAs (one for a partial shift) were assigned to 34 residents, despite the facility’s own staffing plan calling for higher CNA coverage. A resident with multiple serious conditions, dependent for transfers and incontinent, reported waiting over three hours for toileting assistance and described routinely long call-light response times, while a family member reported chronic delays in staff response. A CMA/MT had been independently assessing pain and administering PRN oxycodone, including using a nonverbal pain scale, even though facility policy and state guidance restrict unlicensed staff from performing assessments or making PRN decisions. Multiple residents’ admission and readmission assessments and baseline care plans were completed and signed by LPNs without RN assessment, and LPNs were administering IV ertapenem via PICC lines without documented IV training or formal RN delegation, contrary to facility policy and Wisconsin scope-of-practice standards.
Surveyors found that the facility failed to follow its own food safety and sanitation policies, resulting in expired and improperly labeled food items stored in the walk-in cooler and freezer, including multiple juices and fish past their use-by or manufacturer expiration dates, as well as a torn-open package of hot dog buns exposed to air. They also observed cobwebs, dead insects, and accumulated dust and debris on the wall behind shelving where clean dishes were stored, with nearby window air-conditioning units that could blow contaminants onto the dishes. A dietary aide acknowledged that dietary staff should be monitoring expiration dates, and leadership later confirmed the expectation that expired items and unsanitary conditions should not be present, while 34 residents were placed at risk of foodborne illness.
Failure to Assess and Monitor Skin Wounds and Scars for Two Residents
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to provide treatment and care consistent with professional standards and resident preferences for two residents with skin impairments. For the first resident, who had diagnoses including cerebrovascular accident and hemiplegia and an intact BIMS score of 15, a fall report documented a right front knee abrasion at the time of a fall. Despite this, subsequent weekly skin assessments repeatedly documented intact skin with no indication of a right knee abrasion. When interviewed, the resident reported having a fall that caused a rug burn on the right knee and showed the surveyor a circular wound with a reddened periwound area, yellow center with visible depth, and red lines across the front of the knee. The resident stated staff looked at the wound when the fall occurred but did nothing afterward and expressed a desire for staff to look at and address the wound. Nursing staff interviews revealed inconsistent awareness and monitoring of this wound. An LPN initially stated the resident had no wounds or abrasions and confirmed there was no documentation or monitoring of a right knee wound in the medical record, despite the fall report noting an abrasion. The LPN later acknowledged the right knee wound was related to the fall and that the resident had been picking at it, describing a plan to keep it open to air and monitor, though this plan was not reflected in the record. Another nurse stated that if a wound or bruise is identified, it should be monitored and appear on the MAR or TAR until healed, but also indicated the resident did not have any wounds and only knew of a picked scab from report. The DON was not aware of the wound, found no documentation of it in progress notes, and later stated nurses were not expected to monitor the wound because CNAs observe wounds and report changes, while being unable to state whether the wound had changed in size or wound bed characteristics. For the second resident, who had diagnoses including heart failure and muscle weakness and a moderately impaired BIMS score of 12, the care plan identified potential or actual impairment to skin integrity related to multiple medical conditions. A CNA reported that this resident had a U-shaped area on the left back that had previously been a bruise and had been weeping, and stated this change had been reported to a nurse. A progress note documented a faded bruised area on the left back rib cage with scant blood related to a recent fall, but there was no further documentation of this area in the medical record. Weekly skin check forms over several months repeatedly documented skin as intact, dry, and fragile, with no open areas, and did not identify the U-shaped area on the back. A family member reported observing a U-shaped mark on the resident’s left back rib cage that appeared to be a bruise. Later, the DON presented a photo showing a U-shaped scar on the left back, approximately one inch wide with a line about 1/8 inch thick, but there were no prior photos or measurements to compare, and the scar’s details and location had not been documented on weekly skin assessments. The DON acknowledged that more thorough documentation on the skin check forms would have been helpful and stated that information for these forms was based on CNA observations and nursing assessments, which might not cover all skin areas depending on resident positioning.
Failure to Follow and Update Transfer Care Plans Leading to Unsafe Transfers
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to maintain an environment free of accident hazards and to provide adequate supervision during transfers for two residents. One resident with a history of cerebral vascular accident and hemiplegia, and with intact cognition per a BIMS score of 15/15, had a care plan dated 2/11/26 specifying transfers with a Lumex (manual stand assist lift) and assistance of two staff. Despite this, on 2/15/26 the resident was transferred from a chair to a shower chair by a single RN using a Lumex, during which the resident could no longer stand and was lowered to the ground. The DON confirmed that the care plan required two staff for transfers and that only one staff assisted during the incident, and the RN acknowledged transferring the resident alone, stating they believed only one staff was required. The second resident, with diagnoses including multiple sclerosis and cerebral vascular accident and a BIMS score of 7/15 indicating severely impaired cognition, had an ADL self-care performance care plan dated 2/11/26 that specified transfers with a pivot disc and one staff. However, surveyor observation on 3/31/26 showed a CNA transferring this resident from bed to wheelchair using a Lumex, which the resident successfully completed by following verbal cues. The DON reported that staff had used a Lumex with this resident for four years and verified that the care plan still indicated use of a pivot disc, acknowledging the care plan was incorrect. Therapy documentation showed that a pivot disc had been trialed and recommended for toilet transfers due to a custom-fit wheelchair that did not accommodate the Lumex, and that prior to this trial the resident had used a Lumex for transfers. The DON could not locate therapy notes indicating the resident had been re-assessed for renewed Lumex use, and the care plan had not been revised to reflect the resident’s current transfer method.
Failure to Follow Enhanced Barrier Precautions During Resident Transfer
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to implement its infection prevention and control program, specifically its Enhanced Barrier Precautions (EBP) policy, for a resident colonized with carbapenem-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa (CRPA). The facility’s EBP policy, revised 9/9/25, requires gown and glove use during high-contact resident care activities, including transfers, and specifies that EBP should be followed outside the resident’s room when performing transfers. The resident had a diagnosis of stroke with hemiplegia and an MDS assessment showing intact cognition with a BIMS score of 15/15. A care plan dated 2/18/26 documented CRPA colonization and included an intervention to observe EBP for infection control. On observation, an EBP sign was posted on the resident’s door and PPE was available next to the room. Despite this, a CNA entered the room without donning a gown or gloves and attached a lift sling to a mechanical lift. The Nursing Home Administrator then entered without gown or gloves and operated the lift while the CNA held the resident in the sling and maneuvered the resident into a wheelchair, including holding the resident’s leg and guiding the resident into the chair. After the transfer, the NHA sanitized the lift while the CNA provided the resident a hat and made the bed. In interviews, both the NHA and CNA stated they did not believe EBP was required because they did not consider the transfer to be direct care, and the DON reported being told that EBP was only required for direct care, which they understood did not include transfers.
Failure to Complete Timely Significant Change MDS After Hospice Admission
Penalty
Summary
The facility failed to complete a Significant Change in Status Assessment (SCSA) Minimum Data Set (MDS) within the required timeframe after a resident experienced a significant change in condition. Facility policy on comprehensive assessments, last revised on an unspecified date, states that comprehensive assessments are to be conducted according to the criteria and timeframes in the Resident Assessment Instrument (RAI) User Manual, which requires that an SCSA be completed by the end of the 14th calendar day following determination of a significant change. The Director of Nursing (DON) stated that MDS assessments are completed on admission, annually, quarterly, with a significant change, and as needed, and that a significant change includes a decline or improvement in two or more areas of care or when a resident is admitted to or removed from hospice, with a completion timeframe of 14 or 15 days after recognizing the change. Surveyor review of the resident’s electronic health record showed that the last completed MDS assessment was done on a prior date, and the resident was later admitted to hospice, which the DON identified as a significant change requiring an SCSA. An SCSA was initiated after the hospice admission but was left incomplete and never submitted. The resident subsequently expired, and the DON acknowledged during interview that the significant change MDS had not been completed and was past the 14-day requirement.
Failure to Follow Two-Person Mechanical Lift Transfer Care Plan Resulting in Resident Fall
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure adequate supervision and adherence to the care plan for a resident requiring assistance with mechanical lift transfers. The facility’s own policies on falls and person-centered care planning require implementation of resident-specific fall prevention measures and provision of services as outlined in the care plan. For this resident, the comprehensive care plan identified self-care deficits related to type 2 diabetes and morbid obesity and specified that all transfers were to be completed using a sit-to-stand mechanical lift with the assistance of two staff. The resident, who had diagnoses including abnormal posture, weakness, type 2 diabetes with polyneuropathy, and morbid obesity, and who had no cognitive impairment per a BIMS score of 13/15, experienced a fall during a transfer. Progress notes document that a CNA was performing a sit-to-stand mechanical lift transfer to bed with only one staff member present, despite the care plan requirement for two-person assistance. During the transfer, the CNA had unhooked one side of the sling and was attempting to unhook the other side, had difficulty reaching, and then unlocked the sit-to-stand lift while the resident was partially on the bed, with feet on the lift and holding the bed trapeze. Because the resident was pushing with their legs, the lift moved forward and the resident slowly slid to the floor. Interviews confirmed that staff were aware that mechanical lifts, including sit-to-stand devices, may require two staff depending on the care plan, and that this resident specifically required two-person assistance for transfers. The resident reported that only one CNA was present at the time of the fall and that usually two staff assist due to the resident’s size. Nursing and CNA staff described that they rely on the care plan or Kardex in the computer to determine transfer needs and acknowledged that sit-to-stand lifts can require one or two staff based on the resident’s plan of care. The DON acknowledged that the CNA involved was working alone during the transfer when the fall occurred and was not following the resident’s care plan.
Lack of RN Coverage and Oversight Leading to Out-of-Scope Nursing and Medication Practices
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to employ a full-time RN designated as the DON and to ensure RN services were provided at least eight consecutive hours a day, seven days a week, as required by regulation and by the facility’s own nursing services policy. Payroll-Based Journal staffing data for the first quarter of 2026 showed a one-star staffing rating and multiple days with no RN hours. Review of daily staffing schedules for several consecutive days in March showed no RN scheduled on any of those dates, indicating there was no RN assigned to supervise nursing staff or oversee resident care. The Administrator confirmed that the DON, who had been the only full-time RN, resigned and her last day was mid-March, and the ADON confirmed that since that resignation there had been no RN employed by the facility and that even when a DON was employed, most weekends did not have RN coverage. In the absence of consistent RN presence and oversight, LPNs were performing admission and readmission nursing assessments and administering IV medications, and CMA/MTs were performing pain assessments, administering PRN pain medications, and administering insulin, all of which were outside their scope of practice as described in the report. Multiple residents’ records showed admission data collection and baseline care plan tools completed and signed by LPNs rather than an RN. For example, one resident admitted with diabetes type 2, osteomyelitis of vertebra, and orthopedic aftercare had a 72-hour admission/re-admission assessment documented by an LPN. Another resident admitted with COPD and traumatic ischemia of muscle had admission data collection and baseline care plan tools completed and signed by an LPN, with a late-entry health status note by a sister-facility DON added seven days after admission. Additional residents admitted with chronic congestive heart failure, sepsis, diabetes type 2, congestive heart failure, and ESRD also had admission data collection notes completed by LPNs. The report further documents that LPNs administered IV medications, including through PICC lines, without RN oversight, and in at least one case outside the LPN’s own training and certification. One resident with an order for IV ertapenem had doses administered on three consecutive days by an LPN and the ADON, who is also an LPN. The ADON stated that most LPNs had been trained to administer IV medications, but identified two LPNs who were not certified, while the former DON stated she believed those LPNs were certified and had allowed them to administer IV medications after observing them. CMA/MTs were documented as completing pain assessments and administering PRN oxycodone and insulin injections without an RN employed to provide direct supervision. One resident with diabetes type 2, bilateral stage II heel pressure ulcers, chronic pulmonary embolism, and vertebral osteomyelitis had multiple pain assessments and PRN oxycodone doses documented by a CMA/MT, as well as several insulin doses administered by the same CMA/MT. Interviews with the RDO and Medical Director confirmed that RN coverage was expected to be provided by DONs from sister facilities, but there was no documentation of their presence in the building, and the Medical Director emphasized that RNs are responsible for assessments, IVs, and staff supervision to ensure practice within scope. These combined actions and inactions led surveyors to identify immediate jeopardy beginning in mid-March.
Removal Plan
- Employ a full-time interim DON
- Provide staff education on notification of changes in condition
- Assess nurses' IV competency
- Employ an agency RN to ensure RN coverage on Saturdays and Sundays
- Reassess all residents with IVs, pressure injuries, and new admissions
- Reassess all residents with a documented change in condition
Failure to Assess Resident’s Respiratory Change in Condition and Request for Hospital Transfer
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to assess and respond appropriately to a resident-reported change in condition related to respiratory symptoms. The resident had significant medical diagnoses including COPD, panlobular emphysema, osteomyelitis of the lumbar vertebra, and chronic myeloid leukemia. A recent MDS showed the resident was cognitively intact with a BIMS score of 15 and used a wheelchair for mobility. The care plan also identified a focus on the resident and spouse making inappropriate EMS 911 calls when no true emergency existed, with interventions focused on educating them about appropriate EMS use. On the day of the incident, the resident reported shortness of breath and wheezing and received a PRN nebulizer treatment of Ipratropium-Albuterol, which was documented as effective. However, the LPN did not collect additional assessment data or notify an RN of the resident’s complaint of shortness of breath. No comprehensive respiratory assessment or vital signs were obtained at that time despite the resident’s symptoms. Later that same day, the resident told the LPN that she "may need to go to the hospital" and reported feeling short of breath. The LPN acknowledged that the resident made this statement but did not immediately assess the resident, stating she believed the resident was not in dire need and that the resident often complained of various ailments. According to the resident’s account, she specifically told the LPN that she needed to go to the hospital, was wheezing a lot, and tried to stay calm while waiting about an hour without staff action, after which she called her husband. The husband reported that the resident was crying, calling out in the hallway, and that he called 911 because staff were not doing anything. The facility’s grievance file and staff statements documented that the LPN was aware the resident said she "may need to go to the hospital" but did not complete an assessment before EMS arrived. The resident was transferred to the hospital, where she was found to have hypoxia with low oxygen saturation and was diagnosed with acute hypoxic respiratory failure, chronic pulmonary emboli without acute cor pulmonale, and bronchiectasis with acute lower respiratory infection. The Medical Director later stated her expectation that when a resident states they want to go to the hospital, staff should conduct an assessment, obtain vital signs, and report to the provider.
Failure to Transcribe and Administer Ordered Antibiotics and Wrong IV Medication Administration
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to ensure a resident was free from significant medication errors, specifically related to transcription and administration of ordered antibiotics and the administration of another resident’s IV antibiotic. The resident had a history of lumbar discitis/osteomyelitis and chronic myeloid leukemia and had been receiving IV daptomycin via PICC line following a hospital stay. An MRI in mid-January showed improvement, and the infectious disease (ID) physician initially ordered discontinuation of IV daptomycin, PICC removal, and discontinuation of weekly labs. The following day, after further review of the MRI and inflammatory markers, the ID physician ordered a transition to oral levofloxacin 750 mg daily and oral vancomycin 125 mg daily for several weeks, including vancomycin for C. diff prophylaxis. These orders were faxed to the facility and were later confirmed by the fax company and the Business Office Manager as having been received by the facility. Despite receipt of the faxed orders, the facility did not transcribe the oral levofloxacin and oral vancomycin into the resident’s physician orders or MAR for January or February, and there was no evidence on the MAR that these medications were administered during that period. The physician order listing for the resident showed that the oral levofloxacin and vancomycin orders did not appear until mid-March, when the resident returned from the hospital with those medications ordered. During telemedicine follow-up with the ID physician, the resident reported doing well and tolerating levofloxacin, believing she was taking the ordered antibiotics, even though the MAR showed no administration. The resident, who was cognitively intact per a BIMS score of 15, later stated she only took medications provided by the facility and did not know the oral antibiotics had not been given. The Assistant DON and consultant pharmacist both confirmed that no orders for oral levofloxacin or vancomycin were received by the pharmacy or entered into the system in January or February. In March, the resident was sent to the ER with fever and left knee pain, and imaging showed extensive osseous erosion at L1-2 concerning for discitis/osteomyelitis. The hospital documentation referenced the resident as being chronically on levofloxacin and oral vancomycin for discitis and continued or resumed these medications, which were then first documented as administered at the facility in mid-March. Separately, in January, a medication occurrence report documented that an LPN administered another resident’s IV antibiotic, ertapenem, instead of the ordered daptomycin to this resident. The LPN later stated she did not check thoroughly enough and took the wrong IV medication from the refrigerator, describing it as an honest mistake and noting that previously there had only been one resident with an IV. The facility’s own policies required medications to be administered according to physician orders and required licensed nurses to check and confirm pending orders after physician visits, but the faxed ID orders for oral antibiotics were not processed, and the wrong IV antibiotic was administered on one occasion. The Medical Director stated she was not aware that the resident was supposed to start two oral antibiotics in January as ordered by the ID physician and indicated her expectation that any faxed orders for oral antibiotics would be processed and administered. The Business Office Manager described the process for handling telehealth visit notes and faxed orders, explaining that nursing staff received faxed records and placed them in a bin for scanning into the EMR under a miscellaneous tab. With assistance from the fax company, the BOM confirmed that the fax containing the orders to start oral levofloxacin and add oral vancomycin was received by the facility. The facility’s policies on medication errors and physician orders emphasized preventing significant medication errors and ensuring orders were entered and confirmed, but the failure to transcribe and administer the ordered oral antibiotics and the administration of another resident’s IV antibiotic constituted significant medication errors for this resident.
Inadequate Staffing and Improper Delegation of Nursing and Medication Tasks
Penalty
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to provide sufficient and appropriately qualified nursing staff to meet residents’ needs, and failure to ensure that LPNs and CMAs/MTs practiced within their legal scope and professional standards. The facility’s own facility assessment called for a CNA-to-resident ratio of one CNA for ten to sixteen residents on the evening shift, yet on the evening of survey entry there were only three CNAs for 34 residents, with one CNA scheduled for only a partial shift. Interviews and documentation, including a police body-worn camera narrative, showed that staff and leadership acknowledged difficulty providing needed care due to lack of staffing. The Nursing Home Administrator told police that one resident needed constant care that was difficult to provide because of staffing shortages, and an LPN stated she felt residents needed more attention than staff could provide. One resident with osteomyelitis of the lumbar vertebra, COPD, emphysema, and chronic myeloid leukemia, who was wheelchair-bound, dependent for transfers, and frequently incontinent of bowel, reported waiting over three hours for assistance after a bowel movement, prompting a call to local police. This resident later told the surveyor that call lights usually took 30–45 minutes to be answered and that care was timelier while surveyors were present. A family member reported that it took staff “forever” to respond to this resident’s needs and that he had complained to the ADON about response times. These accounts, combined with staffing records, demonstrated that the facility did not have enough staff on duty to meet residents’ immediate care needs. The facility also failed to ensure that CMAs/MTs and LPNs practiced within their scope and under appropriate RN oversight. A CMA/MT had been independently assessing residents’ pain and administering PRN oxycodone, including documenting pre- and post-administration pain levels, despite state guidance that assessments cannot be delegated to unlicensed personnel and facility policy stating that CMAs/MTs are not to assess pain or administer PRN medications without an RN’s assessment. The CMA/MT reported using both verbal reports and a nonverbal pain scale and believed this was within her scope, while the VPCO and FDON later stated it was not. Additionally, multiple admission and readmission nursing assessments and baseline care plan tools for several residents were completed and signed by LPNs without evidence of RN assessment, even though state standards limit LPNs to data collection and require RNs to complete resident assessments. The FDON and ADON acknowledged that, in the absence of an RN DON and because most admissions occurred on evenings, LPNs had been completing all initial nursing assessments for years. Further, the facility did not ensure that LPNs performing IV therapy had the required additional training and RN delegation as outlined in facility policy and state guidance. One resident with an order for IV ertapenem via PICC line received this medication on multiple days from LPNs, including an LPN whose personnel file contained no documentation of IV therapy training. The ADON confirmed that this LPN was not certified to administer IV/PICC medications, while the LPN stated she had been hanging IV medications via PICC lines since hire, without formal facility training, and was sometimes the only nurse available to administer PICC medications, with the other staff person being a CMA/MT. The FDON stated she supervised licensed staff and had observed LPNs administering IV medications without concerns, but there was no evidence of the documented training and competency validation required by facility policy for delegation of IV tasks to LPNs. Collectively, these findings showed that the facility did not maintain adequate RN presence, did not follow its own delegation and competency policies, and allowed LPNs and CMAs/MTs to perform assessments and IV tasks beyond their scope, affecting all residents in the facility.
Expired Food and Unsanitary Kitchen Conditions in Dietary Services
Penalty
Summary
Surveyors identified a deficiency in the facility’s food service operations related to failure to follow its own food safety and sanitation policies. The facility’s policies required that all local, state, and federal standards be followed, that food be protected from contamination, and that perishable foods be used prior to their use-by or expiration dates, with out-of-date foods discarded. During an observation of the kitchen’s walk-in cooler, surveyors found multiple juice containers labeled by the facility with use-by dates that had already passed, including cranberry juice, orange juice, and apple juice. They also found a container of concentrated lemon juice with a manufacturer’s expiration date that had already passed, despite the facility having applied a later “use by” date that extended beyond the manufacturer’s expiration. Further observations in the kitchen’s walk-in freezer revealed a torn-open package of hot dog buns with several buns exposed to air and an opened box of fish with a manufacturer’s expiration date that had already passed. Additional inspection of the kitchen area showed multiple cobwebs and dead insects on the wall behind portable shelving where clean dishes were stored, along with a buildup of black and gray dust and debris. Two window unit air conditioners were located next to this shelving, with the potential to blow debris and pests onto the clean dishes if turned on. A dietary aide acknowledged these conditions during the survey, stating that all dietary staff should be checking use-by and expiration dates. The Regional Director of Operations later stated it was her expectation that there would be no items beyond use-by or expiration dates and no dust or dead bugs in the kitchen. These failures placed all 34 residents at risk of foodborne illnesses.
Trusted data from CMS and state health departments
Every citation, penalty and Plan of Correction is sourced from public CMS records (latest release May 27, 2026) and official state health department websites — never guesswork.
Trusted by long-term care providers and associations.



