Failure to Assess, Supervise, and Secure Environment Leads to Fatal Elopement
Summary
The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to accurately assess and manage an elopement risk for a newly admitted resident with dementia, confusion, and documented lack of decision-making capacity. The resident had been admitted from an acute hospital where psychiatry documented that the resident was oriented only to self, required constant redirection, and had a 1:1 sitter due to frequent attempts to get out of bed. On admission to the facility, the resident was ambulatory, anxious, frequently expressed a desire to leave, and was identified on a Change of Condition form as an elopement risk. A Wandering & Elopement Risk Assessment completed that morning documented recent observable wandering that was not easily redirected and classified the resident as a moderate elopement risk in one section, but the overall risk score section indicated a Low Probable Risk. RN 2 later stated this assessment was inaccurate and should have reflected a Moderate Actual Risk. The facility developed an Elopement Risk/Wanderer care plan that identified the resident as at risk for wandering due to exit-seeking behavior, new admission status, and verbalizations of wanting to leave. The care plan included goals that the resident would not leave unattended and that safety would be maintained, with interventions such as walking with the resident, redirecting inappropriate behaviors, evaluating the need for additional supervision, and providing close monitoring. Despite this, the facility did not implement continuous or close supervision in response to the resident’s escalating behaviors. Nursing documentation and interviews showed that during the day and evening shifts, the resident had multiple episodes of wandering, agitation, and attempts to exit the facility, including attempts to leave through the front lobby, laundry room, kitchen exit doors, and at least one prior exit to the back patio and another exit from the facility where staff had to bring the resident back inside. Staff reported that 1:1 monitoring used earlier was discontinued once a Wanderguard device was applied, and no CNA was specifically assigned to monitor the resident for safety on the morning of the elopement. The facility also failed to identify and control environmental exit routes associated with the resident’s room and the back patio. The sliding door in the resident’s room, as well as sliding doors in several other rooms, opened onto an outside patio and did not have alarms or devices connected to the Wanderguard system. Maintenance staff confirmed that these sliding doors lacked alarms and that the patio had two gates leading to public streets that could be opened from the inside. On the morning of the elopement, the resident was last seen in the room around breakfast time, ambulatory and changing clothes, and was left unattended while staff attended a huddle. When the nurse entered the room later to administer medications, the resident was missing and the balcony sliding door and screen were found slightly open. A facility-wide search and review of CCTV did not show the resident exiting through the main entrance or other doors, indicating the resident likely exited through the unsecured sliding door and patio area. The resident was later found offsite by emergency responders with severe burn and trauma injuries, and subsequently died at an acute care hospital. The facility did not revise or strengthen elopement interventions despite repeated and escalating exit-seeking behaviors documented across multiple shifts. Nursing notes, MAR entries, and SBAR documentation showed numerous episodes of anxiety, agitation, wandering, and attempts to elope, with staff notifying supervisors and the physician but receiving no new orders and documenting no additional interventions beyond the Wanderguard. The facility did not reassess the resident’s elopement risk classification to reflect the actual behaviors, did not implement continuous visual observation or enhanced supervision as outlined in the care plan, and did not recognize or mitigate the risk posed by the unalarmed sliding door and patio gates. These combined assessment, care planning, supervision, and environmental safety failures resulted in the resident eloping from the facility without staff knowledge and being found later in the community with fatal injuries. State surveyors determined that these failures constituted noncompliance with F689 at an Immediate Jeopardy level when identified, based on the facility’s failure to properly supervise the resident and to have effective interventions in place to prevent elopement. The Immediate Jeopardy was later removed after submission and verification of an Immediate Jeopardy Removal Plan, but the facility remained out of compliance at a scope and severity level G, indicating actual harm had occurred.
Penalty
Resources
Below are regulatory guidelines relevant to this citation:
Trusted data from CMS and state health departments
Every citation, penalty and Plan of Correction is sourced from public CMS records (latest release July 29, 2026) and official state health department websites — never guesswork.
In your survey window? See what surveyors are citing.
The Survey-Prep Report maps your facility's risk from 12 months of CMS and state citation data — what's being cited around you and what to check first. $129 one-time.