F0689

D

Failure to Prevent Elopement and Provide True One-to-One Supervision

Batesville, Indiana Survey Completed on 01-30-2026

Penalty

No penalty information released

Summary

The deficiency involves the facility’s failure to provide adequate supervision and prevent elopement for a resident with known exit-seeking behavior, and failure to provide true one-to-one (1:1) supervision for two residents ordered to be on 1:1 observation. Resident C had diagnoses including non-Alzheimer’s dementia and arthritis and a physician’s order for a wander guard on his ankle with daily checks for placement and function due to elopement risk. His care plan identified him as at risk for elopement based on a history of wandering and dementia, with interventions such as monitoring doors when staff and visitors come and go and redirecting him from unsafe areas. Social services documented that the day before the elopement incident he attempted to follow a visitor out of the facility, triggering his wander guard alarm, after which 15‑minute monitoring was initiated for 48 hours.

On a cold night when outdoor temperatures ranged between 23 and 34 degrees Fahrenheit, Resident C reported that he told staff he did not want to be at the facility and had been told he could not go outside. He stated he then went to a facility door, used a code to exit, and remained outside until he became cold and returned by waving at staff through a side door window. Staff interviews established that around 8:30 p.m. an LPN responded to a wander guard alarm at the front door and saw Resident C in his powered scooter heading down the hallway, and around 9:00 p.m. she saw him sitting in front of the nurse’s station. An RN reported seeing him in the atrium with other residents at about 9:15 p.m. At approximately 9:45 p.m., staff could not locate him and initiated missing resident protocol; he was then found standing outside the doors at the end of a hallway, wearing only a cowboy hat and black underwear, cold, scared, and shivering, with small scratches on his arm and above his left ear. He was sent to the emergency room and later returned with no additional injuries identified. The maintenance director explained that most doors had alarms that would sound even when a code was used, and that two of three non‑alarmed doors had wander guard alarms; however, the back doors of the main dining room could be opened with a punch code without any additional alarm, and the administrator stated that cameras were not working, so the exit door used by Resident C could not be determined.

The deficiency also includes the facility’s failure to provide actual 1:1 supervision as defined in its own policy and by staff and the physician for Residents B and C. Resident B, who was cognitively intact with diagnoses including traumatic brain dysfunction, anxiety, and depression, had recently been hospitalized for an attempted suicide and was readmitted on 1:1 observation, where she remained. Observations showed Resident B lying in bed with a staff member sitting in the hallway outside her room, and at one point there was no call light within her reach. Resident C’s room was directly across the hall, and both residents were on 1:1 observation. A staff member was observed sitting between their rooms in the hallway, with no staff present in the main hallway leading to the main entrance; from the residents’ rooms, approximately nine steps led to the main hallway and another nineteen steps to two exit doors with push keypads and alarms, and if either resident walked nine steps down the hall, they would be out of the staff member’s sight. On another observation, the assigned staff member was looking at her phone while sitting outside their rooms, and at one point Resident C was in the bathroom with the door closed while the ADON sat in the hallway.

Multiple staff interviews confirmed that both Residents B and C were on 1:1 observation and that documentation was done on paper. The primary care physician stated that 1:1 observation meant one staff to one resident. The ADON and administrator, along with the corporate clinical nurse, described 1:1 as having eyes on the resident at all times, with a staff member posted where they could visibly see the resident at all times, and the facility’s written policy on one‑on‑one supervision required a staff member to remain in direct supervision of the resident, with direct visual surveillance at all times. However, staff also reported that one staff member was assigned to both residents on 1:1, and that if Resident C was not redirectable and no additional staff were available, the assigned nurse would have to let him walk away because she could not leave Resident B. The social services director was unsure whether 1:1 meant one staff to one resident and stated that if Resident C walked up the main hallway, she would leave Resident B to follow him. These observations and statements show that the facility did not maintain continuous direct visual supervision of each resident on 1:1 observation and did not ensure adequate supervision to prevent elopement and other accidents for Residents B and C.