Failure to Designate a Qualified Infection Preventionist Led to CPO Outbreak
Summary
Facility 1 failed to ensure that a qualified and designated Infection Preventionist (IP) was responsible for adequately assessing, developing, implementing, monitoring, and managing the facility's Infection Prevention and Control Program (IPCP). Instead, one IP was assigned to cover both Facility 1 and Facility 2, which are separate entities operating under different licenses. The IP reported that she was required to work across both facilities, averaging 45 hours per week, and stated that each facility required a full-time IP to effectively manage infection control. Despite the IP's instructions to prevent staff from working in both facilities during an outbreak, the scheduling coordinator continued to assign direct care staff to work double shifts in both locations, contributing to the spread of infection. A review of facility records and laboratory reports revealed an increase in Carbapenemase-Resistant Organism (CPO) infections in Facility 1, including cases of Klebsiella Pneumoniae Carbapenemase (KPC), New Delhi Metallo-β-lactamase (NDM), and Carbapenem-Resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa (CRPA). The affected residents had complex medical histories, including conditions such as encephalopathy, acute respiratory failure, tracheostomy status, ventilator dependence, traumatic brain injury, spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy, and myotonic muscular dystrophy. The cross-contamination and transmission of these infections to non-infected residents were linked to the failure to implement effective infection control measures and the sharing of staff between the two facilities during an outbreak. Interviews with the IP and the facility administrator confirmed that there was only one shared IP for both facilities, and the administrator was unaware of the regulatory requirement for each facility to have its own IP. The facility's policy stated that the IP should be employed on-site and scheduled with enough time to properly manage the IPCP, but this was not followed. The lack of a dedicated IP for Facility 1 and the continued sharing of staff between facilities during an outbreak directly contributed to the increase and transmission of multi-drug resistant organism infections.
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